

LATINO POLITICS

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■ **Abstract** This review addresses key issues in the study of Latino politics. Foremost among these is the question of low voter turnout. Such factors as income, education, nativity, religion, political party, organizational involvement, neighborhood composition, ethnic attachments, and mobilization of Hispanic turnout have a limited impact on Hispanic votes. I suggest that this is due to differences in the political socialization of Latinos and Anglos. The review also shows that immigrants are focused on U.S. politics rather than home-country politics. Additionally, it describes significant differences regarding the factors that shape Hispanic versus Anglo partisanship. Among the other issues considered is the limited significance of ethnic factors, as compared to partisanship and state of residence, in determining electoral and policy preferences.

LATINO POLITICS

Population increase is the foundation of the developing scholarly and popular interest in Latino¹ politics. This began when the release of the 1980 U.S. census documented the first wave of what would become a continuous, massive inflow of Latino immigrants. Between 1970 and 1980, the number of Hispanics in the United States increased from 9.6 to 14.6 million. Because of immigration, high birth rates among the second generation, and a substantial Mexican- and Puerto Rican—origin native-born population, by 2002, the Bureau of the Census reported that Latinos totaled 38.8 million, which makes them the nation's largest minority.

Beginning in the 1980s, political parties and other institutions became attentive to the potential political consequences of these new numbers. Political science as a discipline, however, has been slow to focus its attention on how this growing population might affect the polity. Do the models that govern the analysis of the

¹Although activists and academics have continuously and sometimes bitterly debated whether to use "Hispanic" or "Latino" to refer to the nation's Spanish-surnamed population, I use these terms interchangeably here. I know of no systematic evidence that documents politically relevant differences at the elite or mass level between those who use one label and those who use the other.

population as a whole, or of subgroups such as African Americans, explain Hispanic political behavior? Do well-established theories of immigrant incorporation apply to Latinos? Do Latino attitudes about foreign policy and public policy in general reflect American values, or are they rooted in and linked to the values and interests of Latinos' countries of origin? Rather than address such questions, the discipline has, until very recently, been uninterested in the Hispanic political world. This attitude is beginning to change. *P.S.: Political Science and Politics* published a review of Latino politics literature in 2000 (Symposium 2000). Moreover, there is finally sufficient research on Latino public opinion to merit a chapter in a leading public opinion text (Uhlman & García 2002).

Because of the discipline's recently developed interest, the relevant literature is fledgling rather than mature. The remainder of this essay reviews what we know and what we need to learn about major aspects of Hispanic politics. It draws almost exclusively on political science literature published since 1990, when the most significant theoretical and substantive advances in the field began to develop. Those interested in a broader range of earlier literature should turn to *Latinos and Politics: A Selected Research Bibliography* (García et al. 1991).

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Theorizing about Latino political life has focused on whether the Latino political experience can be accommodated within the traditional pluralist model or whether it requires a distinct approach. Fuch's (1990) encyclopedic *The American Kaleidoscope* strongly argues for the former. Hero (1992) rejects this approach and argues instead that Latinos confront "two-tiered pluralism"; his model recognizes that even though Latinos have increased their political standing, there are strong limits to the amount of political power they can attain and to the arenas in which they may exercise it. Hero also acknowledges that the group's political experiences vary as a function of national origin, and this makes theorizing about "Latinos" extremely hazardous.

A second question concerns the validity of panethnic concepts such as Latino or Hispanic. Do these labels serve merely instrumental purposes, or do they reflect a new political identity? Jones-Correa & Leal (1996) find that the rise of panethnic identity is associated with a decline in ethnic attachments. In other words, those who identify exclusively as panethnics are more supportive of using English and less supportive of bilingual education than those who primarily or exclusively utilize national origin labels. Furthermore, panethnic identifiers tend to be older and better educated and have a longer generational history in the United States. In sum, it seems that the characteristics usually associated with assimilation predict panethnic identification. Does the continued increase of Hispanic/Latino identifiers indicate that Latino politics is indeed following the pluralist model, as Fuchs (1990) argued?

The consequences of renewed attacks on immigrants or on the use of Spanish, both of which Latinos usually perceive as attacks on the group as a whole, must be

evaluated before answering this question. Current efforts by both major parties to woo Hispanic voters suggest that such attacks are unlikely to be carried out by leaders of either party. Nonetheless, desperate candidates could emulate former California governor Pete Wilson in using such issues to polarize the electorate and mobilize Anglo² voters against Latinos. The likelihood of such tactics could (and should) be tested by developing models to estimate their probable electoral outcome.

The debate regarding theories of Latino incorporation is also complicated by the different experiences of the national origin groups that constitute the Hispanic population. Contrary to the pattern described above, Cubans, the most structurally incorporated group, are the least likely to identify as Hispanics (Jones-Correa & Leal 1996). Shorris (in Moreno 1996, p. 147) suggests this is because, although they have experienced racist discrimination, Cubans “identify with the conquerors (Anglos), not with the conquered (Latinos). . . .” Puerto Rican analysts are especially attentive to this debate (Melendez 2003), perhaps because they hope that its resolution will suggest how to explain and deal with the seemingly intractable social problems that plague Puerto Ricans on both the mainland and the island (Cruz 2003).

Although analysts historically struggled with competing theoretical explanations of the Mexican American political experience (García & de la Garza 1977), today most emphasize the issues that are at the core of mainstream behavioral and policy analysis. Implicit in this work is the view that there are no longer major institutional obstacles explicitly restricting Mexican American access to governmental institutions and the electoral system (Guerra 1998). Indeed, Mexican American political incorporation is so institutionalized that questions regarding how to conceptualize the role of Mexican Americans in contemporary politics are largely restricted to a few case studies that explore the extent to which Mexican American local office holders can reorient public policy to benefit the urban poor at the expense of white middle and upper classes (Regalado 1997, Rosales 2000). Because these critiques acknowledge but do not incorporate the complexities of modern political economies and the constraints local leaders face (Peterson 1981, Stone 1989), they resemble populist appeals more closely than scholarly analysis.

These patterns notwithstanding, there are new issues that may change the nature of the relationship between Latinos and the polity. For example, negative reactions to future immigration could lead to the establishment of new barriers to Latino incorporation and the creation of a new and permanent Latino underclass whose very existence would require reexamining Latino-white relations. Similar results could ensue from demands for explicit state support for cultural reproduction, such as exists in Australia (Jupp 1992). Such developments could easily lead to more polarized relations between Latinos and Anglos and would surely jeopardize the continued applicability of a pluralistic approach as the lens through which to examine Latino political life. In sum, although it now seems that Latino incorporation

²“Anglo” and “white” are used interchangeably to refer to individuals identified as non-Hispanic whites by the U.S. census.

is finally on a path that resembles the one followed historically by the Irish and other European ethnics, the ability of Hispanics and the state to maintain this trajectory will be severely tested by future tensions rooted in continuing demographic developments.

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

The utility of a pluralistic approach to explain Latino political life is demonstrated by the fact that Hispanic political values and attitudes are closer to those of Anglos than to those prevalent in their historical countries of origin. For example, Mexican American views of democracy are typical of Americans and differ from those of Mexicans (de la Garza & Yetim 2003). Furthermore, as Latinos become more settled into American society, they develop more realistic views of the polity and society; for instance, they become less trusting, and they recognize that ethnic discrimination is an institutionalized societal practice (de la Garza 1995; Michelson 2001, 2003a; Michelson & García 2003; Portes & Bach 1985).

That Latino political attitudes are shaped by American attitudes is evident in how partisanship develops among immigrants. The acquisition of party identification is positively associated with years of residence in the United States but is negatively associated with age. This suggests that partisanship among Latino immigrants is acquired principally from experiences with the polity rather than from new social roles that immigrants take on as a function of aging (Wong 2001). Relatedly, the party with which most Latino immigrants tend to identify and the intensity of their identification also reflect their experiences with American political institutions. Given that the Democratic Party has long been associated with minorities and the “working class” and that Latino immigrants fit within both categories, it is not surprising that significantly more identify as Democrats than as Republicans (Cain et al. 1991).

These patterns give rise to questions about the effects of home-country experiences on the acquisition of American values. That the Cuban community has been so intolerant of those who disagree with them regarding relations with the Castro regime suggests that experiences in countries of origin may significantly affect which mainstream values Hispanic immigrant groups learn and accept. Do immigrants from more open societies more easily accept democratic values? What types of values are learned most rapidly and which are the least likely to be accepted? The answers to such questions will increase our understanding of adult socialization and will generate insights into the potential impact of continued immigration on the nation’s political life.

ELECTORAL AND NONELECTORAL BEHAVIOR

Because 39% of Hispanics are noncitizen adults and therefore ineligible to vote, nonelectoral activities are much more significant to Hispanics than to other segments of the nation’s population. Such activities not only provide the only

mechanisms available to noncitizens for making their preferences known, but also can stimulate the development of local civic institutions that produce social capital, which strengthens neighborhoods and empowers ethnic groups. Furthermore, nonelectoral behavior in the form of organizational involvement is highly correlated with electoral involvement among Latinos, just as it is among Anglos (Diaz 1996).

The principal sources for analyzing participation in nonelectoral activities are the LNPS and the Citizen Participation Study (Verba et al. 1995). The latter describes Hispanic nonelectoral involvement as slightly lower than that of African Americans and considerably lower than Anglos', but the study emphasizes that this pattern reflects differences in human capital such as education and income and is not intrinsically a function of ethnicity. Diaz (1996) indicates that Latinos' rate of involvement with nonprofit organizations is comparable to that of African Americans but much lower than that of Anglos.

In their analysis of the LNPS, Hero & Campbell (1996) also find differences across nationality groups. Surprisingly, Cubans have the lowest rates of nonelectoral participation and, despite having much higher incomes, are the least likely to make contributions to political or social causes. Moreover, Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans are more likely than Anglos to attend political rallies, and they are more active than Cubans in other activities as well.

Analyses of Puerto Rican nonelectoral engagement reinforce LNPS results. Melendez (2003), for example, argues that Puerto Ricans are much less politically active than whites or blacks, which Torres (1995) argues is a legacy of patterns of return migration and the role of the Office of the Commonwealth among New York Puerto Ricans. Melendez challenges Torres' argument, noting that there are few sojourners among Puerto Ricans who have lived in the United States at least ten years and that there is no evidence that return migration impedes the political engagement in Puerto Rico of those who do return. Furthermore, the island-born are less likely to engage in politically relevant activities than are those born on the mainland (Stokes 2003). In summary, although we know that the nonelectoral behavior rates of mainland Puerto Ricans are low, we have few insights into why.

It is significant that foreign-born citizens resemble the native-born in their rates of nonelectoral involvement (DeSipio 1996a). DeSipio et al. (2003) show that, regardless of national origin, Hispanic immigrants have very low rates of civic engagement.

Qualitative studies on nonelectoral involvement should complement survey-based research by analyzing the development and impact of community-based organizations. Three that make this contribution are Marquez's *LULAC* (Marquez 1993), his study of San Antonio's Industrial Areas Foundation (Marquez 1990), and Warren's *Dry Bones Rattling* (Warren 2001). The first of these utilizes incentive theory to explain the evolution of the League of United Latin American Citizens from the nation's most historically significant mass-based Mexican American organization to its current status as a much smaller group that depends on corporate and foundation support. His study of Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS), the Alinsky organization in San Antonio, Texas, describes COPS's

successful development in terms of its parish-based foundation and limited reformist policy agenda. *Dry Bones Rattling* provides a comprehensive analysis of COPS's successes and the problems it faces in dealing with non-Mexican American groups situated outside of South Texas, in leadership development and in institutionalizing consensual democracy as COPS's governing rule.

The failure of much of the urban politics literature to describe the development of such grassroots organizations and their roles in effecting local changes is a major weakness in the study of Hispanic political life. As specialists on urban politics (Erie 1994), San Antonio (Booth 1994), and Los Angeles (Cain 1994, Guerra 1994) point out, Skerry's (1993) study of San Antonio and Los Angeles illustrates this failure.

Except for Bridges' (1997) work, the field of American political development (APD), which has established a tradition of rigorous qualitative inquiry, has made virtually no contribution to the study of the institutional foundations of Hispanic politics. APD specialists would do well to consider how the politics of territorial expansion in the Southwest and Puerto Rico has affected both Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans. Latinos committed to qualitative research would benefit equally from immersing themselves in this approach.

ELECTORAL ENGAGEMENT

Historically, Hispanics—and Mexican Americans in particular—had to overcome numerous discriminatory institutional barriers before they could exercise their voting rights (Brischetto et al. 1994). Thanks to the 1975 Voting Rights Act and the efforts of the Southwest Voter Registration and Education Project (SWVRP) and its Puerto Rican counterpart, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF), those institutional barriers began tumbling with accelerating speed by the late 1970s. As DeSipio's (1996b) signpost study shows, the new environment produced by those changes, combined with increased immigration, resulted in the creation of what may be considered a new Hispanic electorate.

Despite the virtual elimination of the old barriers, other less obvious obstacles remain. For example, the lack of Election Day registration disproportionately reduces Latino turnout relative to Anglo turnout (Alvarez & Ansolabehere 2002). Because of such obstacles and other factors, Hispanic electoral influence continues to lag behind the promise of its population size. That is, because Latinos vote at lower rates than Anglos, their influence on electoral outcomes has never attained its full potential in major mayoral or state-wide elections. DeSipio (1996b) disaggregates the native-born and the naturalized citizens to show why this problem is not diminished and may be exacerbated by continuous immigration.

Efforts to explain these voting patterns initially relied on a standard socioeconomic status (SES) model. Contemporary Latino electoral research goes beyond that to include variables such as organizational involvement and various dimensions of ethnicity, e.g., neighborhood composition and the candidate's nationality.

Like other Americans, Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans involved with organizations vote at impressively higher rates than those who are not members of any group (Diaz 1996). Because the effect of memberships is greater among these Latinos than it is among Anglos, this helps reduce the gap in voting rate between Latinos and Anglos. Curiously, Diaz found that organizational involvement had no impact on Cuban political participation. However, as noted above, Hispanic organizational involvement is low, and thus the impact of group memberships on Latino participation as a whole is quite limited.

Applying the standard SES model is, nonetheless, essential to show the similarities and differences in the factors that influence Hispanic and Anglo voting. Although there is no doubt that low SES is a major factor in low Latino turnout, even studies that control for SES find that Latinos vote less than Anglos (Michelson 2003b). Also indicative of the complexity of explaining Hispanic voting are contradictory findings on the effects of variables whose impact is much more straightforward regarding Anglos. Arvisu & García (1996) and DeSipio (1996b) find that age is positively associated with Latino voting, as it is in the general population, whereas Hritzuk & Park (2000) find no association between age and voting. Also, Arvisu & García note that education does not uniformly boost turnout, especially in the case of Cubans.

Hritzuk & Park (2000) further imply that Latino voting suffers because immigration continuously adds to the number of Hispanic citizens who are not well socialized into the electoral system. It is noteworthy, however, that feeling efficacious or viewing voting as a duty or symbolic act rather than as an instrument for changing conditions—attitudes more common among immigrants than among the native-born—leads to higher turnout rates (Michelson 2000a,b; Lien 1994).

It is especially significant that historical or contemporary discrimination has no effect on turnout (Clark & Morrison 1995, Leighley 2001, Michelson 2000a, Uhlanher 1996). Lien (1994), however, reports that perceiving discrimination against their group stimulates Mexican Americans to vote and engage in other participatory activities. Curiously, however, he notes that a sense of deprivation, i.e., perceiving that one's group has fewer opportunities, does not mobilize Mexican Americans.

These patterns raise questions about the utility of the relational goods argument (Uhlanher 1989) to explain high turnout in heavily concentrated Latino neighborhoods. This claim is that concentration generates a set of incentives that benefits group members but can only be realized through highly concentrated Latino neighborhoods. Thus, Latinos in such neighborhoods will vote at higher rates than will those living in low-density areas. A related version of this claim is that high-density neighborhoods are linked through geographically overlapping majority-minority districts such that "get out the vote" (GOTV) campaigns in one stimulate turnout in others.

The evidence regarding the effects of concentration is contradictory. It is strongly supported by Leighley (2001), but her work focuses on Texas and, more significantly, offers no longitudinal perspective. De la Garza et al. (2001/2002) have

an even narrower geographic focus, but their research spans turnout over eight years. They track individual turnout in presidential, congressional, and state-level elections in Houston, Texas from 1992 through 1998 via official records and show that turnout rates are lower for citizens in highly concentrated precincts. Additionally, the results of case studies that examine electoral mobilization in highly concentrated Hispanic districts in Houston, Miami, and Los Angeles (de la Garza et al. 1993), case studies of turnout in majority-minority (highly concentrated) districts in Texas (Cotrell 1997), and more general studies of race-based districting (Weber 2000) challenge Leighley's results.

Two factors that may help disentangle these contradictory patterns are Hispanic voters' experiences of discrimination and the significance of partisanship versus ethnicity in their voting decisions. It is reasonable to assume that the significance of relational benefits secured through voting would increase as perceptions of discrimination increase. Numerous sources report, however, that most Latinos report relatively low levels of discrimination. In 1990, 39% of Mexican Americans said they personally had experienced discrimination (de la Garza et al. 1992). Puerto Ricans reported substantially higher rates, and by 1999 two thirds reported they had personally experienced discrimination (Uhlanger & García 2002). However, the 2000 Knight Ridder/San Jose Mercury News survey found that only 18% of Latinos reported having experienced discrimination in the five years prior to the survey (Uhlanger & García 2002). In Chicago, only 6% of the city's Latinos mentioned racism and discrimination as a local concern, whereas 24% cited these as national problems (Michelson 2000a). Discrimination, in summary, does not appear to be so pervasive as to motivate Hispanic citizens to band together and vote in pursuit of a common electoral agenda, as Latino advocates expect.

The LNPS also shows that Latinos do not automatically rally behind coethnic candidates. When asked whom they voted for when choosing between an Hispanic and a non-Hispanic candidate, they said they voted for the "best candidate" rather than the ethnic candidate. Nonetheless, when given an option between a Latino and non-Latino, 77% supported the former (Graves & Lee 2000). This choice, it must be emphasized, does not necessarily contradict their initial preference. Nonetheless, as a commitment to supporting coethnics would predict, Texas Mexican Americans have relatively low roll off in down ballot elections in which a Mexican American and Anglo are competing (Polinard et al. 1991). On the other hand, Graves & Lee (2000), like Cain et al. (1991), show that ethnicity does not have a direct impact on vote choice. Further documenting this pattern is Michelson's analysis of the 2000 election in California's twentieth district, in which 70%–80% of Latinos voted in favor of the winning Anglo candidate over a highly visible Hispanic Republican. The author's conclusion is that Hispanics want representatives who will help them, and they see the Democratic Party as presenting those candidates (Michelson 2002b).

The argument that geographically overlapping majority-minority districts increase turnout is essentially a refinement of Leighley's argument. The innovative aspect of this work is the attempt to show a synergistic relationship in turnout

among the various types of districts that overlap, that is, to show that increased turnout in one district leads to increases in others (Barreto et al. 2002).

This argument suffers from the key weaknesses of Leighley's work as well as from additional problems. The authors, for example, fail to explain why their results differ from those showing that majority-minority districts dampen turnout in Texas and elsewhere. It is even more noteworthy that Barreto et al. (2002) fail to reconcile the results of work coauthored by Pantoja (Pantoja & Woods 1999), a coauthor of the paper discussed here, that finds that GOTV and mobilization campaigns had little positive impact on turnout in the kinds of communities that make up overlapping majority-minority communities such as those included in this research. The final and perhaps most significant additional criticism is one that Barreto et al. (2002) acknowledge only in passing but is well documented by Barreto & Woods (2003). That is, Latino voters in Southern California, the focus of this study, have been highly politicized by referenda directly dealing with immigrants, bilingual education, and affirmative action. This contributed to increased Hispanic turnout in 1996 and 1998. In 2000, what may have been the most effective Latino GOTV campaigns in the nation were implemented by labor unions and independent Latino advocacy groups in California (de la Garza et al. 2002). In short, Latinos in Southern California live in a unique political environment. Barreto et al. (2002) do not adequately control for the effects of these factors on turnout, and without such controls, their claims regarding the synergistic effects of overlapping majority-minority districts remain unsubstantiated. However, these claims should be considered as a creative hypothesis in need of future testing.

Given these consistent low turnout patterns, how can Latino turnout be increased? From a social science perspective, this question demands new and perhaps unique models that will take us past the logjam we currently confront. From a policy perspective, increasing turnout means finding mechanisms for making government more attentive to the needs of this growing population.

A step in that direction may involve responding to the suggestion (implicit in Hritzuk & Park 2000) that Latino turnout is negatively affected by the continuous incorporation of citizens who are not fully socialized into electoral politics. In keeping with this hypothesis, Leal's (1999) finding that military experience has a significantly greater impact on political attitudes and voting among Hispanics than among Anglos shows that as Latinos learn about government, i.e., increase their levels of political socialization, they become more involved with it. The downsizing of the professional military, however, means that as fewer Latinos serve in the military, the number who become politically engaged as a result of that experience will decline. This may cause a drop in overall Hispanic engagement with the political system unless other institutions substitute for the military to perform its historic socialization function.

Religious organizations are the prime candidate to fill this role. Because the great majority of Hispanics are Catholics, this responsibility primarily falls to the Catholic Church, but the evidence has suggested it does not serve a socialization function (Hritzuk & Park 2000, Verba et al. 1995).

Recent work challenges these findings. Jones-Correa & Leal (2000) suggest that Verba et al. (1995) misfocused their analysis by examining differences in the acquisition of civic skills among ethnic groups, when their focus should instead be on the acquisition of civic skills based on differences in religious denomination. Jones-Correa & Leal (2000) find that church attendance, regardless of denomination, is positively associated with higher levels of turnout, but that differences in denomination explain little about Latino and Anglo political participation. The most significant finding of this research is that being Catholic has a significant and positive impact on turnout in congressional and school board elections. Jones-Correa & Leal (2000) go on to argue that in the absence of other institutions, churches are disproportionately important to Latino civic life and, given their ethnic nature, Latino parishes have the potential to serve as centers for political mobilizing—as evidenced by the success of COPS (Warren 2001).

Lee et al.'s (2002) analysis of a religious survey of 2060 adults completed in 2000 by the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute (TRPI) also leads them to rebut Verba et al. (1995), as well as key elements of the Jones-Correa & Leal argument. Contrary to the latter, they find that church attendance has no effect on electoral participation; the only religious variable that has a positive effect on turnout is a born-again experience. Lee et al. (2002) also find that neither skills learned through participation in church activities nor church-based mobilization significantly affects turnout. Their failure to find turnout differences between Catholics and mainline Protestants, along with the finding that evangelicals and other “Christians” vote less than Latino Catholics, leads them to dispute the claim by Verba et al. (1995) that Latino Catholicism contributes to low turnout.

The net result of these findings is that religious institutions are not linking Hispanics to electoral activities. Nonetheless, those churches that do provide their members with opportunities to develop civic skills may be providing the same socialization services that the military did historically. Even if that is so, however, such opportunities are probably available only to a small percentage of the population. Consequently, churches are unlikely to play a major role in linking Latinos and the state so that they may both be better served.

A growing corpus of research indicates that a more direct way of increasing Hispanic turnout is in GOTV campaigns. Wrinkle et al. (1996), Shaw et al. (2000), and de la Garza et al. (2002b) find that mobilization is a major predictor of turnout even after controlling for SES. Michelson (2002a) also finds, like Shaw et al., that using a Latino messenger significantly increases turnout in outreach campaigns, but de la Garza et al. (2002a) suggest more complicated patterns.

In an experimental study implemented in Los Angeles during the 2000 election by a well-established Latino nonpartisan organization, Ramirez (2002) found large differences associated with telephone canvassing. He warns, however, that there is no evidence that Latinos would respond as positively to outreach by non-Hispanic institutions, including political parties—an argument echoed by Park & Vargas-Ramos (2002). Nonetheless, Ramirez's findings suggest that canvassing via telephone is as effective as contacting potential voters in person. If this is

correct, GOTV campaigns that target Latinos will be much more easily implemented than Shaw et al. (2000) and Michelson (2002a) suggest.

The significance of these findings is enhanced by the fact that the major political parties do so little to engage Latinos. In New York, Jones-Correa (1998) argues, the parties make it difficult for Latinos (and immigrants in particular) to access the electoral system. A similar pattern seems to characterize how political parties deal with Latinos nationally. Leighley (2002) reports that 45% of Anglos, compared to 15% of Latinos, are asked to engage in campaign activity, and whereas ~18% of Anglos and blacks engage in campaign work, only 8% of Hispanics do. Efforts to involve Hispanics in campaign activities, from working on the campaign to contributing money, reach only 17% of them, compared to 47% of Anglos. An ongoing series of studies analyzes the role of Latinos in the eight states with the largest Hispanic populations in presidential elections from 1988 through 1996 (de la Garza & DeSipio 1992, 1996, 1999). These studies show that both parties essentially ignored Latinos, both in small states such as Arizona (Avalos 1999) and New Mexico (García 1996) and in key states including Texas (Montoya 1999, Martínez 1996), New York (Falcon 1999), Florida (Moreno & Warren 1999), and Illinois (Fraga 1992). With the exception of Democratic efforts in California in 1996, during these years neither party systematically implemented GOTV campaigns targeting Latinos. It was especially notable that the Republicans did not implement such efforts in 2000, given their commitment to winning Latino votes.

TRPI polls that have tracked the effects of outreach since 1996 suggest caution in accepting the positive outcomes associated with GOTV campaigns. Although there is no doubt that those individuals contacted are more likely to vote, it is also clear that those contacted have higher incomes and education levels than those not contacted (de la Garza et al. 2002b). In other words, mobilization to date has not targeted the great numbers of Hispanics who are least likely to vote. How effective such efforts will be with this segment of the Hispanic electorate is unknown.

The question, then, of why individual Latinos do not vote at the same rates as comparably situated Anglos remains unanswered. Perhaps the answer is that Latinos are simply less and differently socialized regarding the electoral process. Even when they are native born, psychologically integrated, and patriotic Americans, most have less contact with major electoral institutions and government per se.

Additionally, Hispanics in majority-minority districts need not vote at high rates to have a coethnic elected, so they may come to see their vote as irrelevant even if they think it is important to have coethnics in office. To the extent that they live in overlapping majority-minority districts, as most probably do, this problem is exacerbated. Latinos in districts that are less concentrated, such as those in California, are more likely to be recruited into the electoral process, either to form coalitions to vote for Latino-friendly candidates or to insure that Latinos are elected. Furthermore, low-concentration districts are much more prevalent in California than in any other state with a large Latino population. Thus, the difference in the composition of these ethnic districts is surely a major reason that Hispanic turnout

in Texas is always lower than it is in California. Moreover, the political history of Latinos and their current experiences with American society are not sufficiently negative to mobilize them into the electoral process. Thus, overall, it seems that the most effective way to increase turnout is via old-fashioned political machine-like organizing. Political machines, it should be noted, also function as political socializers, so using such an approach to increase voting will not only serve the short term interests of Latinos but could in the long term prepare them to become autonomous political actors.

A key focus for future research, given these findings, should be comparative analyses of Hispanic voting in minority-minority and influence (25%–40% Hispanic) districts within and across states.

PARTISANSHIP

A related question concerns Hispanic partisanship and its effects on Latino electoral behavior. Long before President Bush reached out to Latinos, journalists, key Republican partisans, and Latino advocates trying to manipulate both parties to their advantage have claimed that the Latino vote is up for grabs (de la Garza 1996). All reliable evidence indicates, however, that except for Cubans, the majority of Latinos have identified and continue to identify as Democrats. Alvarez & Bedolla (2001) report that the patterns described in *Latino Voices* from 1990 remained essentially unchanged in 2000: Overall, 57% of Latinos identified as Democrats; less than half that percentage identified as Republicans. Major national polls produced similar findings (Uhlanher & García 2002). Mexican American partisan affiliation has been especially stable, while Cubans have become slightly more Republican and Puerto Ricans have become slightly less Democratic. Central Americans, who were not included in the LNPS, are strongly Democratic (Alvarez & Bedolla 2001). Thus, changes in overall patterns, slight though they may be, seem to reflect the increased presence of immigrants in the electorate. Whereas 60% of native-born Hispanics identify as Democrats, only 52% of the foreign-born do. These patterns challenge recent claims of a rise in Republicanism among Latinos (Pew Hispanic Center 2002).

Immigrants also identify as Democrats. Cain et al. (1991) find that the longer Latinos were in the United States, the more likely they were to be Democrats. Additionally, Barreto & Woods (2003) find that Latino Democrat registered voters outnumbered Republicans 3.4:1 in 1992, and this increased to 3.88:1 in 1998. Because many if not most of the new registrants were naturalized citizens, this increase suggests that the pattern described by Cain et al. continues.

Latino partisanship is also distinctive in other ways. It primarily reflects social and political rather than economic factors (Alvarez & Bedolla 2001, Uhlanher & García 2002). Barreto & Woods (2003) illustrate this by showing that the issue positions of the major parties explain Hispanic partisan preferences in Southern California. Alvarez & Bedolla (2001) also conclude, after analyzing Hispanic

preferences on a national level regarding key issues such as abortion, illegal immigration, affirmative action, government-sponsored health insurance, and gun control, that policy preferences rather than SES explain Latino partisanship. Furthermore, they argue that current patterns are likely to persist unless the parties substantially change their positions on these issues, which is unlikely. They also warn that ideological changes regarding the appropriate role of government in providing social services could significantly affect Hispanic partisanship patterns. Now that the Republicans are heavily engaged in convincing the electorate of the need for such a change, scholars would be well advised to monitor the extent to which those efforts are penetrating Latino communities.

Alvarez & Bedolla (2001) suggest that national origin, which usually implies a cultural characteristic, has an independent effect on Latino party identification. Their statement ignores the structural factors that have shaped Hispanic partisanship. For example, Republican anticommunism motivated Cubans to shift from the Democratic to the Republican Party; New Mexican Latinos moved from the Republicans to the Democrats as the latter became increasingly supportive of working-class issues; and Mexican Americans in the rest of the Southwest became Democrats because until very recently Republicans had no significant presence, and once they established one, they became associated with antiminority and anti-working class policies. Thus, attributing independent status to national origin easily leads to making ethnicity an unchanging attribute rather than a fluid characteristic, and conceals or distorts historical and ongoing relations between Hispanics and American political institutions.

In view of the centrality of issues to Latino partisanship, it is reasonable to ask how informed Latino voters are about the policy positions of competing candidates and how that affects their voting. Nicholson et al. (2002) show that Latino voters are reasonably well informed about policy issues and the candidates' position on them. Overall, about 51% of Bush voters and 70% of Gore voters held views on issues such as abortion, gun control, and school vouchers that were consistent with those of their preferred candidate. As expected, the most common error was to attribute to one's preferred candidate one's issue preference. Voters who preferred Bush were less knowledgeable about his policy positions, whereas Gore's likeability index was unrelated to knowledge of his positions. Overall, the likeability rating of each candidate had an even greater net effect than partisanship as a predictor of candidate preference.

Bush, thus, seems to have enjoyed some success with his use of Spanish and consistent proclamations about the importance of the Hispanic vote. Nicholson et al. (2002) persuasively conclude, however, that such symbolism was ultimately of limited value, as evidenced by the fact that the great majority of non-Cuban Hispanics remained loyal to the Democrats.

Political participation is more than voting, however. The final sections of this review address the topics of gender, immigrant incorporation, transnationalism, and policy attitudes and influence, with particular attention to Hispanic political loyalties.

GENDER

Qualitative research has contributed significantly to our understanding of Latina political behavior. Hardy-Fanta (1993) shows that understanding Hispanic political involvement requires going beyond the study of conventional political activities, such as lobbying and voting, to include a wide range of interpersonal interactions that have significant political consequences. This may be why, as Marquez (2001) argues, Latina organizations not only have created a new political space for themselves, but their agenda often conflicts with that of white-feminist and male-dominated Mexican American groups. As the case studies of *Barrio Ballots* (de la Garza et al. 1993) show, Hispanic women have also been involved in all aspects of election campaigns.

The empirical study of Latina electoral involvement has developed in parallel with the study of Hispanic participation per se. Just as there was little research on Latino voting in the 1970s and 1980s, what there was ignored how gender affects attitudes and turnout (Welch & Sigelman 1992). Current research indicates that if there is a gender gap, it follows the pattern that characterizes the general population. For example, Latinas are more Democratic than Latinos but only slightly more liberal. Overall, Welch & Sigelman conclude that nothing would be lost if race and ethnicity were ignored in determining the effects of gender on self-described ideology, partisanship, and vote choice, a view Montoya (1996) essentially shares.

Moreover, Anglo women share with Latinas a characteristic that has been the focus of much of this paper. Women vote less than men, and although Hispanic female immigrants vote at higher rates than their male counterparts (Bass & Casper 2001), overall Hispanic women are less likely to vote than white women. To increase the size of the Hispanic electorate, therefore, special efforts must be made to incorporate Latinas. Additionally, there is clearly a need for research that compares Latinas to African American and Anglo women to determine why Latinas vote even less than Latinos, and what factors explain the differences between Latinas and African American and Anglo women.

Similarities among Latinas notwithstanding, there are noteworthy gender-based patterns among Hispanics. Mexican-origin men and women more closely resemble each other in attitudes and behavior than do their Puerto Rican and Cuban counterparts (Montoya et al. 2000). Puerto Rican women are significantly more likely to identify as Democrats than are Puerto Rican men (Uhlanger & García 2002). Also, the factors that influence turnout among women differ from those that predict the male vote. The most consistent predictors of voting for Hispanic women are interest in politics, church attendance, and organizational and school involvement; age, education, and partisanship are noticeably absent. Montoya et al. (2000) conclude that political socialization and institutions influence Latinas more significantly than Latinos.

They also argue that what may be most fundamental to Latinas is that, unlike men, they do not have the financial resources, work skills, and time to be involved in politics. More Cuban women have such resources, and they also have significantly

higher participatory rates. In other words, the Cuban example indicates that it is the lack of resources rather than cultural traditions that explains why Latinas have lower participatory rates than Latinos.

There are also gender differences associated with some of the policy preferences of distinct Hispanic groups. How gender affects attitude toward legal immigration is unclear. Hardy-Fanta (2000) reports Latinas are more supportive of increased immigration than Latinos, but Binder et al. (1997) find no gender effects. Also unexpected is the finding of virtually no differences between Latinos and Latinas regarding increased welfare spending (Montoya et al. 2000).

With regard to women's roles, the LNPS found Cubans held the most conservative views and Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans were the most modern. Surprisingly, however, Hispanic men voice stronger support for abortion than Hispanic women. In 1966, the difference between Hispanic men and women was 15%, whereas among Anglos and blacks the gap was very small. Relatedly, a study on why urban school boards enact sex-related education and health programs shows strong support for such programs among Hispanics (Hess & Leal 1999). This challenges claims that high rates of membership in the Catholic Church and other Christian religions and a strong commitment to the nuclear family would prevent Hispanics from supporting school-based sex education.

IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION

The most significant factor in the growth of Hispanic political influence is the influx of immigrants. Moreover, global immigration is changing the face of America and has great implications for the nation's future politics. It is therefore disappointing that, unlike sociology and economics, political science has not engaged immigration to understand the multiple ways immigrants may affect the nation.

A fundamental characteristic of Hispanic immigrants is their slow pace of naturalization. There appears to be a tendency to explain this in uniquely Latin American terms. For example, Jones-Correa (1998) concludes that a major reason for delayed Hispanic naturalization is that immigrants are cross pressured between the feeling that naturalizing betrays their homeland and the desire to join political communities in the United States. This claim is limited because it is based on a study of 112 Latinos in Queens, New York, and it needs additional testing because Canadians and Mexicans are the two groups with the longest wait between immigration and naturalization. Asian immigrants on average wait 7 years, Europeans 10, and Latin American and Caribbean immigrants between 12 and 14 (DeSipio 2001). This pattern suggests that proximity of homeland, a factor unmentioned by Jones-Correa (1998), plays a major role in the timing of naturalization. Additionally, DeSipio (2001) finds that individual differences such as education and income are more significant than nationality differences in explaining immigrant naturalization, even though national origins continue to have predictive value. Another factor that should be considered is that the second generation have long had

a pattern of distancing themselves from immigrants rather than linking them to the polity (Browning & de la Garza 1986, Mollenkopf et al. 2001). To the extent that different nationalities adhere to this pattern, they could reduce the pace at which conationals naturalize. Finally, it must be emphasized that, except for voting and specialized employment, there are few benefits to be gained from naturalizing.

Most immigrants do not naturalize or do so only after long residence in the United States. In 1990, according to the Census Bureau, only 8 of 19.8 million immigrants had naturalized. As of 1988, one third of Hispanic immigrants had naturalized, one third had initiated the naturalization process (sometimes never to be finished), and one third were not interested in becoming citizens (Pachon & DeSipio 1994). In 2000 (Mollenkopf et al. 2001), only about one third of immigrants had naturalized, and Latinos had the lowest rates of all: 25% had naturalized compared with 40% of Asians, 33% of Africans and black Caribbeans, and 50% of whites.

The National Latino Immigrant Survey (Pachon & DeSipio 1994), the most detailed source on Latino naturalization and political incorporation, offers numerous insights into immigrant motives regarding naturalization. The naturalization rate for all immigrants is higher than the rates for Latinos as a whole, but rates differ among Hispanic nationalities. The rates for Cubans, Dominicans, Central Americans, and South Americans eligible to naturalize all exceed 80%, with Cubans the leaders at 88%. The Mexican naturalization rate is the lowest at 69%.

Respondents reported that civic and participatory reasons were their primary reasons for naturalizing (Pachon & DeSipio 1994). However, although 86% of immigrants surveyed indicated that the right to vote was very important to their decision to naturalize, among the recently naturalized, neither this nor any other reason that spurred naturalization influenced the likelihood of voting. DeSipio (1996a) also notes that their self-reported turnout rates varied between 40% and 60%.

Naturalization rates may have temporarily increased in the mid-1990s because of a variety of factors. Fear of Governor Pete Wilson and Proposition 187 uniquely affected California's Mexican immigrant population and spurred citizenship applications. At the national level, the large number of Mexicans who came in under the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1986 were required to renew their immigration status, and other Latino immigrants also had to renew their "green cards" to maintain their status as legal immigrants. For both of these groups, it was just as easy and no more costly to naturalize as to renew their status as legal resident aliens. Thus, many chose to naturalize, and this may have resulted in a temporary spike in naturalization rates. Additionally, Latino political leaders finally recognized that getting immigrants naturalized and to the polls was the key to greater political influence, and for the first time (Pachon 1998), they mobilized in support of naturalization campaigns.

Patterns of immigrant civic engagement in activities for which citizenship is unnecessary are mixed. The LNPS shows that naturalized and native-born citizens have comparable rates of organizational involvement. However, a subsequent

qualitative study of four communities in California and New Mexico found that the foreign-born had lower levels of civic and political engagement than the native-born (Segura et al. 1999). Nonetheless, regardless of how much lower their rates of participation are in civic or political activities, naturalized Mexican parents are as active in schools as are Anglo parents (DeSipio 1996a).

With regard to electoral engagement, there is a strong correlation between time spent in the United States and the likelihood of registering and voting (Bass & Casper 2001). That time in the United States has a greater effect on registration than on voting suggests that GOTV efforts should be more successful than they apparently are. Curiously, whereas being married has a positive effect on registering and voting among the native-born, it has a negative effect among naturalized citizens (Bass & Casper 2001).

There is broad agreement that naturalized Hispanics vote at lower rates than the native-born. This is predictable given that they have the demographics associated with low turnout, they reside in communities candidates tend to ignore, and they are not well socialized in American electoral politics. Although this pattern characterizes Latinos nationally (Bass & Casper 1999), there are differences associated with nationality and location. Naturalization seems to stimulate voting among Cubans, who have voted at higher rates than Anglos, but it has no effect on Mexican Americans (DeSipio 1996b). Indeed, Mexicans had the lowest of self-reported turnout rates at 43%, whereas Salvadorans reached 47% and Cubans, Dominicans, and Guatemalans exceeded 60% (Bass & Casper 2001). In New York City, turnout in 1996 declined by $\sim 1\%$ for each 10% increase in the immigrant population, and in Los Angeles the decrease doubled (Mollenkopf et al. 2001). Mexican naturalized citizens are one third as likely to vote as are Dominicans. In New York City, which has programs for immigrants and naturalization as well as unwelcoming politicians, the naturalized are more likely to vote than the native-born, but in Los Angeles they are less likely to do so (Mollenkopf et al. 2001).

In California as a whole, Latino immigrants vote at lower rates than the native-born. But among Mexicans, the turnout gap is 17%, whereas other Latino immigrants are $\sim 12\%$ more likely to vote than white immigrants are. Nonetheless, Hispanic immigrants who have lived in California since 1970 vote on average 17% more than the native-born, but those who arrived after 1980 vote 15% less than the native-born (Citrin & Highton 2002). Contradicting this pattern is the finding that Hispanics who naturalized in California between 1992 and 1996 were $\sim 23\%$ more likely to vote than all other Latinos, including the native-born (DeSipio & Pachon 2002).

DeSipio (1996b) reports that national origin is not a significant factor distinguishing voters from nonvoters. Equally noteworthy, in keeping with the research on mobilization reviewed above, is that state of residence is the most regularly significant variable affecting immigrant turnout. There is disagreement regarding the effect of marital status, gender, employment status, home ownership, and metropolitan residence on the immigrant's propensity to vote (Bass & Casper 2001, DeSipio & Pachon 2002).

The consensus that Hispanic naturalized citizens vote less than the native-born is consistent with the hypothesis that immigrant Latinos are not well socialized into the polity, that they reside in heavily ethnic neighborhoods where GOTV campaigns are the exception, and that their demographics predict low turnout. Thus, although immigrants will not increase Latino turnout to rates comparable with those of Anglos, neither will they drag them down. More significantly, Hispanic political clout rides the crest of the immigrant wave. Immigrants are the core around which new Latino districts have been constructed at every level of elected office. They know it and the officials know it, and that shared knowledge is the basis of their growing influence. This is why, whether they vote or not, the immigrants now have access to elected and appointed Latino and non-Latino officials. DeSipio's (2001) argument that low voting rates will diminish the immigrant's influence relative to the native-born therefore seems to understate the overall role that immigrants play in Hispanic politics.

Nonetheless, it is important to determine the key factors that influence turnout among immigrants. If, as has been suggested, these are the same factors that influence the native-born, then the same tactics could be used to increase turnout. If other variables are at work, or if some are more significant among the naturalized than among the native-born, such as socialization or psychological perspectives, then specific tactics that target the naturalized must be pursued. It will also be necessary to go beyond conventional survey research and incorporate institutional variables, such as local- and state-level institutions and indicators of ethnic residential concentration, to develop a full picture of the dynamics of immigrant incorporation.

TRANSNATIONALISM

A new issue that is closely related to immigrant incorporation is transnationalism. Like immigrant incorporation, it is essentially ignored by political science despite its significant political implications. The increasing availability of airline travel, cell phones, and international banking services has enabled continuous interactions between Latin American immigrants and their countries of origin. It is argued that such interactions have brought about a new relationship between immigrants and their countries of origin. From a disciplinary perspective, transnationalism refers to the impact of this alleged new relationship on immigrants' political incorporation.

The relationship is extremely complex and fluid. It is unclear, for example, whether the emigrants or home-country political actors are primarily responsible for transitional initiatives such as absentee voting. In Colombia's case, Jones-Correa (1998) asserts the emigrants initiated these demands. My research with Colombian political leaders and scholars found widespread agreement that including such rights in the 1991 Constitution was one of several signals given by the drug traffickers (through the congressmen they controlled) to Colombian "mules" in U.S. prisons to assure them that their interests in Colombia were well

taken care of (de la Garza et al. 2000). In Mexico, a case Jones-Correa mentions but does not analyze, opposition party leaders since 1988 have worked so closely with the emigrants that it is impossible to determine the source of the demand for absentee voting. It is reasonable to assume that similar complexities color other aspects of state-emigrant relations in most cases.

Whereas most of the literature on transnationalism focuses on familial or cultural contact with sending communities, or on economic linkages including remittances for family maintenance or investment, DeSipio et al. (2003) describe the extent to which emigrants engage in explicitly political transnational activities. A major consequence of their work is that it refutes the notion implicit in much of the literature that transnationals are sojourners who do not develop strong ties to the United States. Furthermore, it is the first approach that tests the frequency of transnational politics among emigrants and the persistence of transnational political activity over time. The authors operationalize political transnationalism in terms of efforts by emigrants to maintain or reestablish political involvement in the communities of origin through contributions to political campaigns, voting, lobbying for the vote in countries where it is not yet granted, and even running for office in the home country while residing in the United States. The study, based on a national survey of Dominicans, Mexicans, Salvadorans, and island-born Puerto Ricans, documents how limited political transnationalism is. Dominicans were the most likely to have attended a meeting dealing with home-country politics or to have belonged to a group consisting of members of their communities of origin, but only 1 in 5 had participated in such activities. Indeed, the only behavior that engages a majority of Hispanic immigrants in what might be a transnational political activity is following the news from home.

Respondents were much more likely to be involved in organizations that focus on U.S. activities than in those that emphasize transnational ties. Case studies of Mexican immigrant organizations in Chicago, Los Angeles, Dallas, and New York show that even groups composed entirely of members from one sending community are much more likely to provide services to help members integrate into America, such as English classes, than to offer programs aimed at maintaining ties to the home country (de la Garza & Hazan 2003).

It is also important to note that key transnational behaviors, such as remitting, decrease over time (DeSipio 2001) and that as immigrants and their children become more incorporated into American society their attitudes toward immigrants and immigration become more negative (de la Garza & DeSipio 1998, Newton 2000).

DeSipio et al. (2003) also show that those immigrants engaged in transnational organizations and political activities are more likely to be involved in American elections, and that those who were engaged in electoral activities in their homelands were more likely than those who had not been to be involved with elections here. One possible explanation for this pattern is that it reflects a tradition of political activism shared by a small group of immigrants. Alternatively, it could reflect a new kind of politics that flows from transnational interactions. There is no evidence

that this is the case, but if it is, transnational politics may have significant long-term implications for inter-American relations and American politics generally. Thus, the question merits further investigation.

Huntington (1996, 1997, 2000) has repeatedly warned that even without political ties to the homeland, Latino immigrants threaten the nation's political fabric. Given his prominence in the discipline, it is essential to respond to his views because of how they may influence the discipline (see Smith 2000) and policy makers. He begins with a futuristic hypothetical scenario in which Hispanics use their new political clout to impede American efforts to defend the national interest in a new war over energy reserves because of their lack of commitment to the "national interest" (Huntington 1996). He then explicitly criticizes the Council on Foreign Relations for its efforts to incorporate Latinos into foreign policy circles as part of its effort to broaden the foreign policy community, because of their continuing political commitments to their home countries (Huntington 1997). His views culminate with the conclusion that Mexican immigration threatens the United States' cultural integrity, national identity, and perhaps its very future as a country (Huntington 2000). He argues that (a) Mexican intermarriage has decreased; (b) a Mexican American cultural community with no need to speak English could develop, as he alleges has happened with Cubans in Miami; and that, without Mexican immigration, (c) illegal immigration would be relatively minor, (d) education levels would be very high, and (e) bilingual education would diminish.

Some of these arguments are contradicted by scholarly research, and others are little more than contentious allegations. The first and second are demonstrably false (de la Garza et al. 1992, Bean & Stevens 2003). The third is theoretically indefensible. Eliminating Mexican undocumented migration would, of course, reduce Mexican illegality, but immigration theory indicates it would have no effect on illegal immigration from elsewhere in Latin America and other parts of the world except perhaps to increase it because the structural forces that shape immigration would remain in place (Bean & Stevens 2003). The fourth is contentious. Eliminating Mexican immigration would raise national educational levels. However, the educational levels of Mexican immigrants advance rapidly from the first to the second generation; the lack of significant improvement in educational levels in the third and fourth generations is not because of cultural factors but because of the lack of public and private resources (Bean et al. 2001). Finally, although most Mexican Americans support bilingual education, they see it as a means of learning English (de la Garza et al. 1992) rather than as a means of retaining Spanish. Moreover, Greene (1998), a Manhattan Institute Fellow, has found that the net educational effect of bilingual education is small but positive.

Further evidence that undermines the transnational claims and the allegations regarding the threat Mexican immigrants (and their native-born children) pose to the nation is these immigrants' support for core American values, such as essential elements of democracy and economic self-sufficiency. Based on an analysis of Mexican American patriotism and support for political tolerance and economic individualism, de la Garza et al. (1996) conclude that, regardless of whether they speak English, are foreign- or native-born, or have an intense ethnic consciousness,

Mexican Americans support American core values as least as much as Anglos do. Dowley & Silver (2000) also find no statistical differences between Anglo and Latino patriotism and agree that ethnic attachments do not lead to alienation from the larger community.

De la Garza et al. (1997) test two models—one based on Hispanic cultural attachments and the other based on the assumption that American socialization structures how Latinos view Latin America and U.S. foreign policy in the region—to determine which better explains Hispanic attitudes toward U.S. policy in Latin America. They found that (a) Hispanics gave the United States the highest thermometer scores³ of the ten countries included in the study; (b) not only are Latinos not uniformly positive about Latin America, they differ among themselves in their affect toward specific Latin American countries; (c) no nationality group ranks more than one of the five Latin American countries in the study positively on a thermometer scale; (d) English monolinguals and bilinguals express lower affect than do Spanish monolinguals for Latin American countries; and (e) the respondents do not see Latin American countries as constituting a distinct, unified dimension. The ways in which they group them with other countries from across the globe indicate that Latinos view Latin American countries in ideological or policy-specific terms rather than in cultural terms. Overall, the analysis strongly rejects the cultural model and supports the structural model.

Nonetheless, the foreign policy views of Latino elites differ somewhat from those of Anglo elites (Pachon et al. 2000). According to a 1998 survey, they consider the environment and world hunger much more significant than maintaining military power and defending allies' security. With regard to Latin America, however, their goals are the same as those of the U.S. government, i.e., to strengthen democracy in the region and promote international trade and investment. If Latinos were to lobby on behalf of these goals, they would be emulating “other Americans” in pursuit of legitimate goals within the United States and in advocating that the government of the United States act on its principles and in pursuit of its objectives” (Dominguez 2000, p. 157).

Their involvement in and attitudes toward foreign policy, regarding Latin America and in general, are distinctive in other ways, however. Most significant is their lack of engagement in foreign policy. Hakim & Rosales (2000) report that, except for the Cuban American National Foundation, neither the national Latino organizations [such as the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) and National Council de la Raza] nor the Congressional Hispanic Caucus focuses on international issues. Thus, Hispanics exert almost no systematic influence on U.S.–Latin American relations or foreign policy in general. Furthermore, in their analysis of case studies of emigrant–home country relations involving Dominicans, Guatemalans, Colombians, Salvadorans, and Mexicans, de la Garza et al. (2000) found no evidence of emigrants lobbying in the United

³A thermometer scale ranks a respondent's feelings about a person or issue by giving their feelings a score of 0–100. The higher the score, the “hotter” the respondent feels about the person/issue.

States on behalf of the home country. The only possible exception to this is their involvement in proimmigration issues, which, though benefiting the home-country government, is more clearly self-interested behavior. For this reason, Dominguez (2000, p. 157) concludes that if Huntington is correct about ethnics undermining the national interest through their involvement in foreign policy, "U.S. Latinos are not at the root of the problem."

Furthermore, the foreign policy views of significant proportions of Hispanic elites run counter to Latin American preferences. For example, more than half of the Hispanic elites interviewed would support unilateral political and economic policies toward Mexico in order to deal with a hypothetical problem caused by drug trafficking or to prevent massive immigration resulting from political turmoil, and more than 40% support unilateral responses to human rights violations anywhere in the hemisphere (Pachon et al. 2000). Such unilateral responses are especially repugnant to Latin American governments. Contrary to established U.S. preferences and more in keeping with Latin American preferences, they favor increasing the attention the United States pays to Latin America and decreasing our European emphasis, and they do not support further increases in military spending.

Additionally, fundamental differences between Latinos and Anglos may be developing. Davis & Silver (2003) report that 56% of Latinos compared with 49% of Anglos agreed that the United States was responsible for the hatred that led to 9/11. On the other hand, in a 2002 TRPI survey, more than 75% of Latin American immigrants indicated there was no justification for the 9/11 attacks. More noteworthy are findings that indicate that Latinos are less likely than Anglos to state they are willing to fight for the United States (Dowley & Silver 2000). This suggests they are becoming less patriotic than Anglos, contrary to the earlier findings of de la Garza et al. (1996). Future research should test the hypothesis that this new pattern reflects immigrants' resentment of the effects of American policies on their homelands and of anti-immigrant policies such as California's Proposition 187.

A tangentially related issue is the status of Puerto Rico. Barreto (2002) persuasively argues that what is at stake in the status debate is demands for increased autonomy but not political independence. Thus, even though Puerto Ricans intensely and successfully protested the continued use of Vieques for bombing practice and remain intensely divided between favoring statehood and commonwealth status, islanders appear to remain strongly pro-American and manifest no signs of decreasing commitment to the nation.

POLICY CONCERNS

Although their policy priorities closely resemble those of Anglos (Uhlanger & García 2002), it is reasonable to expect Latinos to have distinctive views on issues that, given their history and current status, particularly affect them. These include immigration, affirmative action, and relations with the courts and police.

Regardless of national origin, Latinos rank immigration among their lowest priorities (de la Garza et al. 1992, Pachon et al. 2000), and although most Latinos agree with the majority of Anglos that there are “too many immigrants” coming to America (de la Garza 1992), the most acculturated are the most likely to favor reduced immigration (Hood et al. 1997). Further evidence of the limited affect of cultural ties on attitudes toward immigration is that the Hispanics who supported Proposition 187 were Spanish-dominant noncitizens who would be targets of discrimination if the proposition passed (DeSipio & Pachon 2002).

Hispanic attitudes toward affirmative action are similarly varied. Overall, the majority of Latinos support it, but Cubans’ views closely resemble those of Anglos. Nonetheless, slight majorities of Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans, compared with 73% of Cubans and 91% of Anglos, favor using merit rather than affirmative action to allocate benefits. Also, 73% of Latinos support selecting students for college without consideration of their racial or ethnic background (Uhlhanher & García 2002). Still, more than 75% of California’s Hispanic voters opposed that state’s anti-affirmative action referendum. On the other hand, even though the majority of California’s Latinos believe that affirmative action is still needed to assist Hispanics, blacks, and women, 51% of Hispanics and 56% of Anglos agreed that ethnics use special programs to get benefits they do not deserve (Cain et al. 2000). Clearly, although Latinos support affirmative action, their views are complicated and nuanced.

According to a national survey by the National Center for State Courts, Hispanic attitudes toward police and the courts are also unexpectedly supportive (de la Garza & DeSipio 2001). Twice as many have positive views of police as have negative views (48% versus 24%), and they are as likely as non-Latinos to have positive views of the court. Although 34% reported they had been discriminated against by police, 43% said they had not. The foreign-born were slightly more likely to be positive about police even though they were also more likely to report discrimination by police. Although those who have negative views of the courts and report police discrimination constitute a significant segment of the Latino population, they are fewer than might have been expected given the negative history of Latino-police relations. This relatively positive perspective is another indicator of why Hispanic voting is not more responsive to ethnic cues or relational goods incentives.

POLICY INFLUENCE

Prior to 1990, ethnic gerrymandering and a variety of institutional rules, such as the lack of term limits, were major impediments to Latino office holding. Thanks to continued demographic growth throughout the 1990s and contentious redistricting implemented because of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) during that decade, increasing numbers of Latinos across the country now serve in every level of elective office except the U.S. Senate, presidency, and vice presidency. Because the

changes that followed the 1990 redistricting were so far-reaching, Guerra (1998) argues that although the formal rules hurt Latinos prior to 1990, since then Latinos have benefited from them. Although Guerra's analysis focuses on California, it probably applies to all states that have undergone similar institutional changes. As the success of English-only referenda illustrates, however, this increased influence is effective when policies are managed within constrained environments but is of no consequence when policies are handled through nonlegislative channels (Santoro 1999).

This reinforces the argument by Hero & Tolbert (1995) regarding indirect substantive representation in Congress. Kerr & Miller (1997), contrary to Hero & Tolbert, find that Hispanic congressmen directly represent Latino interests and that the increase in Hispanic legislators at all levels is likely to lead to even more direct interest representation, just as demographic growth should lead to greater indirect representation. The extent and consequences of such increases merit scholarly attention.

Enhancing the likelihood of direct and indirect interest representation is the establishment of a permanent Hispanic presence in Washington. The first phase of this process was effected during the Carter administration, when the number of Hispanic political appointments was so high that these appointees developed a network that most used to advance Latino interests (de la Garza 1984). The second phase was the institutionalization of an Hispanic lobby involving the major Hispanic organizations, which first flexed its muscle during the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 debates (Sierra 1999). The third and final phase is the increase in Hispanic congressmen and the institutionalization of the Hispanic Congressional Caucus. Given that almost all the congressmen are Democrats and that the organizations that make up the Hispanic lobby are officially nonpartisan but actually support a Democratic agenda, how effectively can they represent Hispanics when Republicans control the White House and Congress? How well do these congressmen represent their constituents given low voter turnout rates in their districts? What does it mean for the Hispanic community that the organizations that lobby on behalf of Latinos are sustained by corporate and foundation grants rather than by dues-paying members? These are some of the questions that analysts should address in order to determine how effectively Latinos are represented at the national level.

At the local level, research on educational policy, a priority issue for Hispanics (Uhlanger & García 2002), indicates that Latinos enjoy the benefits of effective direct representation (Fraga et al. 1986). Hispanic students in districts that use ward or mixed election systems, which result in Latinos being elected to school boards, are better off than students in districts that use at-large elections. This is because the presence of Hispanic school board members is associated with an increased number of Latino teachers; this in turn is associated with numerous positive outcomes, such as increases in programs for gifted students, increases in graduation rates, and decreases in corporal punishment (which leads to lower graduation rates) (Meier & Stewart 1991).

CONCLUSION

The past decade has seen significant developments that affect the study of Latino politics. The initial task was to make it possible to analyze the Latino political world. This has been accomplished, thanks to case studies, political ethnographies, and surveys that to a significant degree targeted Latinos to the exclusion of other groups. The best example of this approach is the LNPS. Now, however, it is clear that an Hispanic-specific emphasis should be abandoned in favor of a broader, comparative approach that will explicate the similarities and differences between Hispanics, Anglos, and other groups.

The first step in implementing this approach will be to modernize NES so that it includes a representative sample of the nation's new demography and questions that address the new issues that affect the political life of these new populations. This means more than having Latinos statistically represented; it means restructuring NES sampling procedures so that it is regularly possible to understand Latino perspectives and their impact on national political life. This is not an outlandish proposition given that the Hispanic vote could determine the outcome of a presidential election.

The alternative approach is to replicate the LNPS and other surveys, such as that of the San Jose Mercury News, but this will keep Hispanics out of the discipline's mainstream. Such an effort will, of course, produce significant new data, but, like the LNPS, its value will diminish over time, and this will lead to demands for LNPS III. The only way to avoid this is to move Latinos to the center of the discipline, which can only be done through NES.

Additionally, because structural factors, such as parties and state and local institutions, have been shown to be more analytically relevant than national origin, researchers should be less concerned that their studies include representative samples of all Hispanic nationalities and more focused on insuring that the relevant institutional variables are included. For example, there is no compelling theoretical reason to expect Salvadorans to differ from other immigrants because of their nationality. Instead, it is reasonable to hypothesize that immigrants from countries that experienced civil wars, such as Guatemala, Colombia, El Salvador, and Nicaragua may differ in politically significant ways from those who left more stable homelands, such as Ecuador, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. Also, the political orientations immigrants developed before arriving in the United States should be analyzed to determine their impact on immigrant political behavior.

This review also convinces me that immigrant political incorporation requires more and deeper analysis. Immigrants claim that the desire to vote is a major factor stimulating their naturalization, but few vote after becoming citizens. Why? Relatedly, to what extent do Hispanic immigrants account for increasingly negative assessment of U.S. foreign policy and the disinclination among Hispanics, relative to Anglos, to serve in the American military?

In view of the consensus in the literature that Latino voting is essentially unaffected by the historical experiences of racism and exclusion, and few significant

barriers to political participation remain, what justifies the continued demands for VRA protections? This is an especially important question given that majority-minority districts appear to reduce voter turnout and that currently the primary beneficiaries of VRA protections are immigrants, most of whom never experienced the discrimination that gave rise to the VRA.

This review also leads me to ask how well Latino interests are served. Although Hispanic concerns are relatively well represented directly and indirectly in legislatures, the fact that low turnout essentially makes elected officials unaccountable to the Latino electorate is troubling. Also, because the national organizations are primarily accountable to corporations and foundations rather than to a Latino membership, I question how effectively Latino concerns are represented regarding immigration or other controversial issues on which overall Latino preferences are much more conservative than the policies pursued by organizations.

My readings also make it clear that qualitative research is essential to an understanding of the nuances and distinctiveness of Latino political experiences. Although this type of research should be encouraged, it would be more useful and widely accepted if it adhered to established methodological approaches such as APD. This would enable researchers to pursue their interest in the kinds of political behaviors that survey data usually miss while also dealing with issues of causality.

Perhaps what I found most surprising from this review is that ethnic factors are, in general, less significant than partisanship, issues, and class variables in explaining Hispanic voting. A possible exception to this is the role of coethnics in GOTV campaigns. To what extent, therefore, should GOTV campaigns emphasize nonethnic versus ethnic appeals? More important, is it possible to combine these nonethnic characters with ethnic indicators to develop a new conceptualization of the terms Latino/Hispanic that will help develop a more comprehensive approach to the study of Latinos?

Together, these conclusions lead me back to the theoretical question with which this essay began. Is pluralism the best model for analyzing Latino politics? Twenty years ago I would have said no. Today, based on my understanding of the material I have read, I respond with a qualified yes. This is not to say that anti-Hispanic racism no longer exists; instead, as a result of long and bitter struggles, Latinos are now part of the mainstream and have attained the clout to influence the system from within as well as from without. The major problem they will confront for the foreseeable future concerns immigrant incorporation. If the state does not provide immigrants access to the political mainstream, Latinos may find themselves in the kind of struggle they faced prior to the 1980s. Far from pluralistic, that situation would be best understood as a racially constructed unstable polity dominated by Anglo elites. Perhaps because I am heir to the optimism that characterizes Latinos, I do not think the nation will degenerate into those conditions.

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