

---

Original Article

# “So a new day has dawned for Porto Rico’s Jíbaro”: Military service, manhood and self-government during World War I

Harry Franqui-Rivera

Hunter College, CUNY

**Abstract** For Puerto Ricans, World War I provided the opportunity to test and challenge the linkages between military service, manhood, citizenship and decolonization. During the war, Puerto Rican political leaders, elected officials and opinion makers sought to advance the socioeconomic and political standing of their communities by demanding access to, and encouraging participation in the US military. In particular, Puerto Rican elites were interested in mobilizing the Puerto Rican peasantry, reasoning that training would transform them into modern men worthy of self-determination in the eyes of the metropolis.

*Latino Studies* (2015) 13, 185–206. doi:10.1057/lst.2015.9

**Keywords:** WWI; manhood; Puerto Ricans; military service; citizenship; colonialism

---

On 11 November 1918, an armistice between the Allies and the German Empire came into effect halting the First World War. A few days later, 12,000 soldiers and trainers of the Porto Rican contingent of the National Army marched out of the gates of Camp Las Casas. Amid fireworks, dancing and flags of the United States and the allied nations, the celebration climaxed with a military review of the Porto Rican Division in the Plaza 2 de Marzo in Condado (*Porto Rico Progress*, 29 November 1918).<sup>1</sup> The plaza’s name commemorated the Jones–Shafroth Act of 1917, which extended US citizenship to the inhabitants of Puerto

1 The Celebración appeared in *Porto Rico Progress*, an English language newspaper that was published between 8 December 1910 and the early

1960s, and it was decidedly pro US.

2 In this paper I use *jibaro* interchangeably with peasantry to follow the contemporary common usage found in the documents used in this discussion.

Rico. The symbolism was hard to miss. For Puerto Ricans, World War I was a stage on which to test and challenge the linkages between military service, manhood, citizenship and decolonization. During WWI, Puerto Rican political leaders, elected officials and opinion makers sought to advance the socioeconomic and political standing of their communities by demanding access to, and encouraging participation in the US military. In particular, Puerto Rican elites were interested in mobilizing the Puerto Rican peasantry, commonly referred to as *jibaros*.<sup>2</sup>

Historically, the insular peasantry has been ambiguously represented by the local elites as both capable of the most sublime nobility and as the truest icon of Puerto Rican identity, but also as a drawback for the island's society, as "rustic" men incapable of political consciousness (Scarano, 1996). Puerto Rican elites invested in mobilizing the insular peasantry were, in fact, betting on the "modernizing" and "reforming" qualities attributed to military training in the early 1900s. Such training, many local and American observers argued, would forge a manlier, modern and more productive *jibaro*, a "teacher of democracy." By seeking to reform or regenerate the peasantry via military service, and hoping that such transformation would change the island's socioeconomic and political realities, Puerto Rican elites were, in a way, still blaming the peasantry for the island's colonial status and economic maladies.

Puerto Rican leaders who thought that participation in the war would somehow transform into political equality or/and self-determination and government were not breaking new ground. Members from minority groups, and colonial subjects, have joined the militaries of their respective countries and/or empires as a means to improve their socioeconomic standing and to gain acceptance from mainstream dominant groups (Burk, 1995, 503–505), as well as for patriotism, and the thrill of adventure. In turn, leaders from these communities have tried to transform their service into political gains, from obtaining full citizenship to ending or ameliorating colonial relations by proving their community's collective worth.

Military service may work as a vehicle for enfranchisement, but it is also used as a tool for denying full citizenship and self-government to entire groups. Subordinated roles in, or outright exclusion from the military, are used to rationalize limited citizenship and the construction of colonial subjects. This is done by linking military service and martial prowess with fitness for self-government in the most gendered and racialized terms. For example, the colonial militia *ante* Revolutionary War excluded Blacks and Native Americans from the requirement that every able male own a weapon and train regularly with their local units. Another case in point, in ante-bellum New York, African Americans were barred from serving in the state militia and then denied citizenship on the basis of their failure to serve in it. Military service gradually became an almost universal rite of passage for white males to the point that during WWII eight out of ten eligible men in the United States served in the military (Moskos, 1993, 85–86).



As several scholars have pointed out, preventing non-White males from military service, or limiting their role to a supporting character, denied them of this rite of passage and helped to create and perpetuate the myth that non-White men were not adults or full men, and hence unworthy of full citizenship, and unfit for self-determination and government (Kaplan, 1993; Moskos, 1993; Burk, 1995, 507; Hoganson, 1998).

This article addresses the intersectionality of gender and race as it pertains to military service and political rights and enfranchisement.<sup>3</sup> Military service is simultaneously used to provide men from the dominant group with a way of proving their manhood and aptitude for self-government while denying the same opportunity to subaltern men. In this discussion, I make reference to the literature documenting the experience of other non-White groups in the US military, particularly during WWI, to provide a framework for better understanding the Puerto Rican experience, and responses to the challenges presented by domestic and international racial and gender hierarchies. I demonstrate how Puerto Rican elites thought access to military positions was essential in advancing the political standing of their communities. In fact, as argued by several scholars, demanding first inclusion, and then equality in the military during the first decades of the twentieth century, was both a precursor and an integral ingredient of the civil rights movement of the 1960s (Lentz-Smith, 2009; Ramírez, 2009; Williams, 2010) and of the decolonization projects that would take place in Puerto Rico in the 1950s (Franqui, 2010).

The narratives explaining participation in the war used by leaders of the African American, Mexican American and Puerto Rican communities were in fact similar. However, the experience of African Americans and Puerto Ricans in the war was marked by a unique feature. Both communities served in segregated units and as such, their actions, or lack thereof, were easily identifiable as the effort or failure of a collective. On the other hand, Mexican Americans, just like Native Americans, served in White units (Ramírez, 2009). Nonetheless, even if serving in segregated units, participation in the war could translate into political gains. The willingness to serve, even under unequal terms, could dent the myth of racial inferiority found at the core of limited citizenship and the colonial status of Puerto Rico. By exploring this line of thinking, I shed light on the Puerto Rican leaders' reasoning as they cheered for and volunteered Puerto Rican masses into military service.

Although the military has traditionally attracted Latinos in great numbers, their experience in the service and what it means for them has been mostly ignored. The Latino presence in the military has increased in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, and it is expected to increase even more, while the "Hispanic" veteran population is projected to double by 2040 (US Department of Veterans Affairs, 2013). During this same period, Latin American undocumented migrants have been enticed into service by the promise of streamlined US citizenship (US Department of Defense, 2008; US Citizenship and Immigration

3 Intersectional analysis considers multiple sources of domination interacting simultaneously to generate inequality while rejecting the assumption that one source of domination has primacy over others in shaping the lives of individuals and sections of society.

4 The US Citizenship and Naturalization Services expedites the application and naturalization process of non-citizens already serving in the US Military. By May 2008 over 39,000 service members had obtained US citizenship since the beginning of the war in Iraq in March 2003.

Services, 2013; Plascencia, this volume).<sup>4</sup> Understanding how the Latino community in general, and, in this case, Puerto Ricans in particular, have sought socioeconomic and political enfranchisement via military service is as relevant today as it was a century ago.

### Redefining Manhood through Military Service

Understanding the Puerto Rican experience and approach to serving in the US military requires a review of American narratives and constructions of manhood at the moment of extra-continental expansion. Hoganson (1998) has argued that gender served as a “coalition building political method” that helped to consolidate different and contradictory arguments while unifying peoples from different walks of life in favor of war with Spain in 1898. Although not universally, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries most Americans agreed that there were “important differences between men and women and that those should affect individual identities, social practices, and political organization” (3). War was one of those public realms completely reserved for men. And, on the eve of the War of 1898, it was widely accepted that combat “would bolster American manhood” (8). Mainstream narratives glorified military action because it was supposed to provide the grounds for the making of better men vested in complete manliness “a prerequisite for full citizenship and political leadership” (10).

As suggested earlier, not all men were to be given the same opportunity to prove their manhood. In her seminal work, “Black and Blue on San Juan Hill,” Kaplan (1993) has explained how African American soldiers who participated in the Spanish-American-Filipino-Cuban war of 1898 were portrayed as inferior to their White counterparts, prone to panic and cowardice, and only able to perform acceptably when firmly and often brutally led by White officers (228). From Theodore Roosevelt’s account of the war to yellow press reports, the contribution of African Americans was constructed in a way that portrayed them as unfit for leadership roles, if not outright service. Such characterizations were used to reinforce racial hierarchies at home, and to ease racial anxieties and the fear of racial contamination as the US expanded extra-continentially (221–231). It is not coincidental that the US military began to restrict the role of African Americans in the military after the Spanish-American War and the subsequent Filipino insurrection against American rule ended.<sup>5</sup> In 1906, Congress even recommended barring African Americans from the military. The Black press denounced this action as a southern conspiracy to exclude African Americans from full citizenship by discrediting the ability of Black soldiers and excluding them from the military (Dalfume, 1969). Precluding Blacks from combat positions, and denying them officers’ commissions, was the local manifestation of an imperial ideology justified on the grounds of the incapability of darker races to achieve full

5 Filipinos opposed the American presence in their homeland after the War of 1898 ended. Fighting between Filipino and American forces broke out in February 1899. The war lasted over 2 years.



manhood and self-government. In addition, all the prejudices used to explain segregation and the “inferiority” of African Americans were applied to the newly acquired territories.

Indeed, the popular gendered and racialized discourses used in support for the war in 1898 had post-war repercussions that went beyond the US mainland. As military service became the ultimate proof of manhood and a prerequisite for full citizenship and self-rule, calling into question the military prowess of Cuban and Filipino rebels became in itself a rationalization of these groups’ incomplete or compromised manhood and thus of their inability for self-government (Pérez, 1998). Constructing non-White peoples in such way became a popular rationalization for empire. Cuban rebels, instrumental in securing a US victory in Cuba, were portrayed as lacking even more in martial prowess and manliness than US Black troops (Kaplan, 1993, 222–226). The implications are clear. The African American soldier was slightly better and manlier than his Cuban counterpart because the former was led and controlled by White officers. These narratives then worked domestically and internationally, serving both to strengthen racial hierarchies at home and abroad, while working as a rationale for denying Cubans and Filipinos full self-government and determination. This logic was easily extended to Puerto Ricans who did not have a rebel army waiting to greet the invading American army.

## Challenging the Empire’s Gender and Racial Hierarchies

Race and gender go hand in hand in imperial designs. Constructing men from certain racial and ethnic groups as not manly-enough, as inferior men, which denies them full citizenship and/or self-determination and self-government, can only be done in gendered terms. Such discourses were understood by Puerto Rican leaders who had their own notions of manhood before having to deal with those brought by the new metropolis. I argue that precisely because of their understanding of the links between martial prowess, manhood, full-citizenship and self-rule, they opted (for the most part) to demand access to the military. Even within colonial arrangements there is space to negotiate internal power relations “of gender, race, class, age and so on” (Briggs, 2002, 198). Participation in the colonial structures of power of the metropolis may provide the tools and opportunities to undo the rationale for racial and gender hierarchies at home and imperial policies abroad. This is not to say that subaltern subjects join the military consciously thinking they are destroying oppressive gender and racial structures. Nonetheless, even if unbeknownst to these soldiers, their willingness to serve weakens the rationales supporting such constructions. Hence, though at first glance Puerto Ricans seem to be adopting the hegemonic group’s ideology by seeking to participate in the metropolis’ military, they are in fact challenging established hierarchies.

When the United States invaded the island in 1898, many local leaders thought that Puerto Rico would become a state of the Union or be granted independence. Leaders of the annexationist movement in Puerto Rico believed that as a “civilized,” and “Christian” people fit for self-government, the Puerto Ricans would be smoothly incorporated into the Union (Bernabe Ramos, 1996, 16–18). However, they failed to consider that among the leadership and opinion-making groups in the US, Catholicism was not considered the religion of the “civilized,” nor were Catholics believed to have an aptitude for democratic self-government (Gribbin, 1975). Worse yet, Puerto Ricans were considered to be the result of miscegenation; a mix of Indian, Black and Spaniard. Captain Mahan (1899), whose work influenced American military strategy and foreign policy for decades, regarded the people in the new possessions as alien subjects “still in race childhood.” The rationale used to keep Puerto Rico as a colony, as well as the Philippines, was that the majority of its inhabitants were not capable of self-government mostly due to their racial composition and centuries of Spanish obscurantism which made them an easy prey for European powers (Mahan, 1899; Johnson, 1980).

Contemporary imagery of the inhabitants of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, presented them as ape-like black beasts, or as Black children in need of Uncle Sam’s guiding White hand (Johnson, 1980). That the United States came to control Puerto Rico in 1898, when the dictums of Social Darwinism, pseudo-scientific racism, the white men’s burden and manifest destiny combined to guide US policies (Stephanson, 1995, 28, 43–42, 60, 79–84), upset the hopes of those seeking either independence or inclusion into the Union as a federated state. Illustrative of the contempt that the new metropolis had for the inhabitants of its new territories, the US War Department and the first American military governor of the island reported that there were no capable local men to form part of a civilian government in Puerto Rico, and a military government ensued until 1900 (Picó, 1987, 66–68).

### **Scapegoating the Puerto Rican Peasantry**

Puerto Rican elites, to different degrees, were quick to blame the peasantry for the island’s supposed inadequacy to become part of the Union or an independent republic. However, it would be simplistic to believe that they had just adopted the views of the new metropolis. Before the American invasion, many local leaders had argued that the best they could hope for under Spanish sovereignty was a type of autonomy due to the peasantry’s state of illiteracy and abject poverty. Luis Muñoz Rivera, one of the main leaders of the island’s liberals, defended a higher degree of autonomy as opposed to independence from Spain, which given the people’s circumstances, he believed was an impossible utopia. The scapegoating of the local peasantry was not a new phenomenon. Since at least the mid-1700s, local elites had used the image of the peasantry in the form of the *jibaro* ambiguously.



Francisco Scarano has traced the development of characterizations of *jibaridad* and the coexistence of two almost-contradictory meanings assigned to it. In “the eyes of the modernizing, rationalistic elites, the tactics of peasant survival seemed barbaric, conducive only to vagrancy, crime and political paralysis” (Scarano, 1996). However, by the middle of the nineteenth century, representations of a multiethnic *jibaro* served as a type of proto-nationalist icon for Puerto Rican elites (1400). Puerto Rican liberal *criollos* used the “*jibaro* masquerade to identify themselves as ethnically different from other members of the elite while maintaining the basic outlines of a colonial relation” (1401–1402). After the United States gained control of the island in 1898, intellectuals and political figures recreated a *jibaro* figure in opposition to American domination. The *jibaro* figure, “now absolutely whitened,” was converted into the repository of a higher form of “patriotic morality, the very essence of the Puerto Rican nation” (1404). Post-American invasion, local literary production elevated the figure of *el jibaro* to national iconography, but continued to depict him with the same ambivalence and demeaning connotations, as when originally adopted as an ethnic and national definer by the ascending *criollo*<sup>6</sup> political class in the previous century (Scarano, 1996). By 1898 the *criollo* elites had not discarded their negative and condescending view of the *jibaro*, as evidenced in literary production. These attitudes were even more obvious in the elites’ quotidian interactions with the peasantry (Ashford, 1934, 3–5).

As US politicians and strategists used gender and racial narratives to explain why Puerto Rico would be neither a state nor an independent republic it was quite easy for local elites to believe that they were not the “problem” but rather the illiterate rural masses. Furthermore, Puerto Rican leaders were not averse to the belief that military service created better and manlier men and neither were they oblivious to the linkage between it and self-government. Puerto Rico’s pre-1898 military and political history moved the island’s socioeconomic elites to try and secure positions within the US military soon after the war had concluded. In the decades previous to the American invasion, the local elites witnessed how the Spanish authorities demobilized the Puerto Rican peasantry and effectively limited the political power of those born on the island (Negroni, 1992; Franqui, 2010). In general, the island’s political leadership believed that demobilization had weakened their position when dealing with the Spanish metropolis while making the Puerto Ricans weak and complacent (Franqui, 2010). For these reasons, local elites sought participation in the metropolis’ military since the early days of the American invasion (Muratti, 1946).

6 In this context *criollo* refers to island-born individuals of European descent, and in some cases, to those of mixed ancestry who gained entry into the island’s upper class.

## Early Puerto Rican Experience in the US Military

One of the first proponents of military schooling and service in the US military was Eugenio María de Hostos, a devout champion of the island’s independence.

In 1899, Hostos, as one of the Puerto Rican commissioners traveling to Washington to discuss the future of the island, urged President William McKinley to reduce the American occupation forces and to create a native militia. Military instruction would be “a tool for the physical strengthening and discipline of the life and character of the Puerto Rican people” which would eventually make them ready for independence (Hostos, 1995, 154–156; Negroni, 1969, 283–284). He also proposed the establishment of seven institutes where military training would promote discipline of the body and soul, and teach strong work ethics and concepts of rights and obligations. He believed that military training promoted the civic virtues needed for self-government.

Regardless of the racist ideology behind US expansionism, which portrayed non-White males as incapable of self-rule, or perhaps because of it, after 1898 Puerto Rican leaders used the same “right to fight” approach, historically employed by African American leaders, to obtain political enfranchisement. Puerto Ricans started to serve in the US military in 1899 (Report of the Military Governor of Porto Rico, 1902, 106), and the local political leaders would follow a similar path to that chosen by African Americans when it came to extracting political concessions based on the services performed by their constituencies in defense of the American nation. Initially, service in the US military did not invalidate but rather reinforced gender and racial discourses behind imperial expansion. Puerto Ricans were to serve in the US military, but in limited numbers, originally under American officers, and as colonial troops (Puerto Rican Provisional Regiment of Infantry, 1904). The officers’ corps was eventually opened to Puerto Ricans in 1904. However, until WWI there were few Puerto Rican officers and they mostly served in junior positions as field officers. These “native” officers (and many of the enlisted men) belonged to the upper crust of the island’s society and many had received degrees from American universities (Marín Román, 2009, 220–226). Moreover, those who could claim whiteness filled those few officers’ slots and provided the manpower for the island’s units until WWI. The US census of 1899 and the Spanish Census of 1897 counted 61.8 per cent and 64.3 per cent of the population, respectively, as “pure White.” The reasons for the small discrepancies are a subject beyond the scope of this article. For the purpose of this study it is enough to establish that under both Spain and the United States there were people on the island who would be accepted as White by the metropolis (Departamento de la Guerra, 1899, 35–36, 57–60).

Colonial administrators, easing the concerns of their superiors in the War Department, assured them that the Puerto Rican soldiers inducted in the Porto Rican Battalion of Volunteers were “a selected body of men” (Reports of the War Department, 1900, 105). Reflecting the dominant attitude toward military service and manhood, the new metropolis’ administrators expressed great hopes for the role of military institutions as a “character builder” and “a very potent education influence” that would help in rebuilding the Puerto Ricans and securing their loyalty (Allen, 1900). Many local opinion makers and political leaders believed





that military service would serve to transform the Puerto Rican peasant into a modern and manlier being. But, not everyone was welcome into the colonial units of the American Army. The metropolis' officials had their own plans, racial beliefs and prejudices. They preferred men of a certain class, education, and color to be admitted into their colonial army. Hence, the military remained virtually closed to the peasantry in general, and to Black Puerto Ricans in particular, until WWI.

## **African Americans and Mexican Americans Respond to the Call to Arms**

On 6 April 1917 the United States entered World War I on the side of the Entente. The racial and gender imperial discourse that came into full swing in the aftermath of the Spanish-American war of 1898, and the responses to it, would be even more critical during WWI. The need for domestic stability led to the mass mobilization of African Americans (Allen, 1979, 25–27). Black leaders linked supporting the war effort and fighting in the war with achieving political equality. In 1916, W.E.B. DuBois, acting as editor of the NAACP's publication *The Crisis*, supported Black participation and the creation of a segregated officer training program on the grounds that if it was not done, African Americans would have to fight under White officers. This stand, as argued by Richard Dalfume (1969, 11–14), reflected the general attitude of the African American population toward the war. African American leaders, who had denounced abhorrence of dark races as the real cause of the war, identified the United States and the Allies as the lesser of two evils, and thus, as their best chance for advancement. Although very critical of the subordinated condition of African Americans in civil society and within the military, the Black press made use of patriotic discourses to exhort African Americans to join the fight. The majority of the African American opinion makers and the Black press adopted a policy of “first your country, then your rights” and of “Close Ranks” with “our fellow White citizens” (Du Bois, 1918; Allen, 1979, 25–27). Over 380,000 African Americans either volunteered or were conscripted during WWI and served in segregated units. Roughly 90 per cent of those soldiers were assigned to labor units instead of combat ones (Butler, 1999).

The Mexican American press also aided the recruiting effort. Publications such as *La Prensa* (San Antonio), *Evolución* and *El Demócrata Fronterizo* (Laredo), embraced the patriotic narratives and the “ideals of justice and democracy” used by the Allies to rationalize the war (Christian, 1989, 573, 568). Patriotism became the most used trope for the Mexican American population in the Southwest. Some newspapers praised volunteering for war and highlighted the exploits of Mexican Texans in the war as acts of patriotism while emphasizing

their role as American citizens and role models for future Mexican American generations (577). Patriotic fervor, ethnic pride and ethos of manhood were evident in the Mexican American press and the letters and memoirs of *tejano* soldiers (Ramírez, 2009, 20–24, 28–29, 35, 109–110). Also, “more prosperous Mexican Americans played an important role in mobilizing other Mexicans and Mexicans Americans” with some taking “increased interest in their rights as United States citizens’ in the postwar years” (Christian, 1989, 565–566).

The War Department assigned people of Mexican ancestry to White units. Focusing on Spanish surnames to identify soldiers of possible Mexican ancestry, Ramírez (2009, 22) found that in the state of Texas this group accounted for roughly 5000 of the 197,000 Texans who served during the conflict. A 1918 Selective Service report shows 59,114 Mexican Americans registered for the first draft. 26,114 were called up and 5794 were accepted (Alanis Enciso, 2010, 936–938). Proportionally the participation of Mexican Americans in the war was low representing just about 7.6 per cent of the total non-Whites accepted during the first draft period and just about 2.52 per cent of the total Texan contingent (937–938). The low participation rate is attributed to White Americans’ preference for using Mexican-Americans as cheap labor, their view of this community as “foreign,” and the racial biases held by Anglo-Americans (Christian, 1989; Ramírez, 2009; Alanis Enciso, 2010, 938–943).

### **The “Patriotism” of the Puerto Rican Elites and Local Politics**

On 2 March 1917, the Jones Act extended American citizenship to the natives of Puerto Rico. The passing of the Jones Act so close to the declaration of war on Germany and its allies on 6 April 1917, created a unique situation for Puerto Rican leaders. Three days after the declaration of war, the Porto Rico House of Delegates offered President Wilson the “absolute solidarity of the people of Puerto Rico to you and the great American Nation in the conflict with Germany” (*El Águila de Puerto Rico*, 1917). On 18 May, Congress passed the Selective Service Act of 1917 calling for all males between the ages of 18–32 to register, excluding the territories of Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. Shortly thereafter, the Puerto Rican legislature asked Congress to extend the draft to the island (House Committee on Public Lands, Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Possessions, 1947, 35–36). The local and national newspapers labeled this request as an act of patriotism. President Wilson promised to remedy the situation and the first draft date in Puerto Rico was soon set for 5 July, even though Governor Yager had asked to “to have the date fixed during the later [*sic*] part of July, although it would be necessary to have 10 or 15 days for publicity work among the Jibaros [*sic*] and illiterate men of the mountain” (Yager, 1917b).



Puerto Ricans were not granted citizenship so they could be drafted into the military. Under the legal provisions of the Foraker Act of 1900, which preceded the Jones Act, the inhabitants of the island had become “citizens of Puerto Rico” and “American nationals,” which qualified them for the draft. In 1909, officials from the War Department concluded that even though American citizenship would be well received by the Puerto Ricans, collective citizenship was a premature step since the majority of Puerto Ricans, they argued, were illiterate and unprepared for full political rights. As an alternative, the Office of the Secretary of War suggested facilitating the individual acquisition of US citizenship by natives of the island who were educated and owned businesses or land (Estades Font, 1998, 204–206). However, even the most pro-metropolis Puerto Ricans rejected such an approach (Pagán, 1972, 173–174). Citizenship on an individual basis would reinforce the stereotype, that as a group, Puerto Ricans were apt for neither self-determination nor for inclusion in the Union as equals.

The same “collective worth” rationale was applied to military service. For annexationist, represented primarily by the Partido Republicano, but also by the Socialists, the war presented the opportunity to show that extending citizenship to all Puerto Ricans had not been a mistake. Throughout the war, they adopted the “100 per cent Americanism” ethos of President Wilson’s and the George Creel’s Committee on Public Information as their own. Through their publication, *El Águila de Puerto Rico*, the Republicanos echoed Creel’s campaign of blind patriotism and Americanization. Exhortations to: “Prove that you are a 100 per cent American” and slogans such as: “Today is an honor to say: ‘I am an American’ ” framed drawings of whole Puerto Rican families, boys dressed in military garment, an older father with his hat off and a mother carrying a baby; all, solemnly watching the Puerto Rican troops marching under the American flag (*El Águila de Puerto Rico*, 9 October 1918).

The Partido Unión, composed of both separatists and autonomists, wanted the war effort and the mobilization of the Puerto Ricans to lead to independence or more self-government, respectively. Hence, they approached every aspect of the mobilization on the island as if they were raising a Puerto Rican army and not a US army contingent. For that matter, Félix Córdoba Dávila, Unionista and Puerto Rican Representative to the US Congress campaigned for units to be raised in Puerto Rico and fully composed, trained and led by Puerto Ricans (Córdoba Dávila, 1918). Annexationist, separatists and autonomists made common cause on this matter. But they did so, not simply because of the economic incentives of establishing training camps on the island. Governor Arthur Yager was the only person openly making an economic case for the training of Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico. But he did so while also praising Puerto Rican leaders and communities for donating their money, time and effort to support mobilization (Yager, 1917a; Paralitici, 1998, 25–29). The weak opposition to military service stemming from pro-independence leaders was marked more by their silence than by outspoken opposition. Moreover, even separatist leaders of the stature of



Nemesio Canales, José de Diego and Luis Lloréns Torres supported joining the war effort (Paralatici, 1998, 65–66).

## Military Training and the Metamorphosis of the Jíbaro

The Puerto Rican elites wasted no time in volunteering the peasantry into military service. Historically singled out as economic dead weight, and as a political drawback for its supposed state of backwardness, illiteracy, poverty and unmanly character- the *jíbaro* was to be transformed into a new man by virtue of military service. Many political leaders and opinion makers, convinced of the ills of the peasantry, were invested in seeing the Puerto Rican peasant transformed into a modern, manlier entity ready for political equality. The local press wrote about the *jíbaro* becoming the core of the national army, and several publications argued that military service would cure the Puerto Rican peasant of his “organic poverty,” the result of “malnutrition and disease” (Del Valle Atilés, 1917), and transform him into a teacher of liberty and democracy, paving the way for at least more self-government. Editorializing about the effect of military training and service on the Puerto Rican peasant, the *Porto Rico Progress* announced: “So A New Day Has Dawned for Porto Rico’s Jibaro [*sic*];”

Downtrodden, unthought [*sic*] for as he [the jíbaro] has been, he is now in the limelight. The testing and refining process [of military training] will be hard for him. But he and his brother will become the nucleus of a new Porto Rico. The anemic disease warped man will be a thing of the past. And the domain of the Jíbaro will at last come into its proper place in the great Economic and Social scheme of this island. (E.R., 1918)

*El Buscapié* editorialized: “After the War, these soldiers will be our greatest leaders, teachers, and champions of freedom and democracy” (*El Buscapié*, 1918). Military training would make the Puerto Rican soldiers manlier and stronger, better citizens ready to teach and lead others. Commenting on the attitude of the public when seeing the Porto Rican soldiers, the editorial continued, “nobody can watch them without feeling a revolution within their blood and spirit which moves them to support in any possible way our soldiers ...” (1918). The local Red Cross, Clubes de Damas (women’s clubs or associations), and the townspeople made sure that the departing recruits received care packages. At their arrival to the training camp, recruits carried a bill book with the inscription “Adelante Soldado Portorriqueño” and other items appealing to their ethnic and national pride, such as cloth with the inscription “Recuerde el Carolina”<sup>7</sup> and the words of La Borinqueña (*Porto Rico Progress*, 5 July 1918), considered at the time a national hymn that would become the national anthem in 1952.

7 *El Carolina*, a ship carrying Puerto Rican workers to the United States, became a sort of Puerto Rican “Maine” during the war after being sunk by a German submarine.



The patriotic, reforming and modernizing narratives put forward by the island's press and political leaders, and by the metropolis, combined with Puerto Rico's martial tradition and the island's dire socioeconomic situation compelled the common people to register for the draft and volunteer for military service. Any opposition to military service was drowned by the overwhelming support of the Puerto Rican upper classes and the masses' enthusiasm with military service. On the first registration day, 104,550 Puerto Ricans registered for the draft. Eventually, 236,853 men signed up for selective service. Of the 17,855 ordered to report for service only 139 did not report for duty (Muratti, 1946, 8; Paralitici, 1998, 49–50).

Puerto Rican leaders expected to advance their respective agendas after showing the willingness and readiness of their people to come to the defense of the United States and the ideals of freedom and democracy. Many believed that participating in a war sold as a crusade against imperialism, totalitarianism, militarism and colonialism would bring decolonization and equality at home. This is not to say that the peasantry held the same ideals as the elites. Individuals surely joined out of a sense of duty, or to better their socioeconomic situation, or, as many European youths had done in the summer of 1914, they joined driven by romantic notions of war and heroism. However, the message of manhood, patriotism and ethnic pride prevalent in the Puerto Rican media resonated with the masses. A *jibaro* commented that seeing his wife and children crying as he prepared to leave for training, he told them that “it was for the Patria and the Patria would protect them if I fought to protect her.” Another commented about his wife and children: “They’ll be all right. The Gobierno will take care of them” (*Porto Rico Progress*, 1918). These *jibaro* soldiers expected their sacrifice not to be in vain. In their understanding, they were not fighting for a foreign power, but for their motherland, and in case they made the ultimate sacrifice, the motherland, via the government, would honor a social contract and take care of their families.

### 100 per cent Americanism: The Military as a Melting Pot?

Proclaiming that “any man who carries a hyphen around with him carries a dagger that he is ready to plunge into the vitals of the republic,” President Wilson launched a campaign promoting 100 per cent Americanism as a cultural corollary to the war effort (Tischler, 1986). Wilson championed the creation of a national army that would unify the multi-ethnic United States into one nation. The participation of Mexican Americans, classified as “White” by the military, furthered the plans of the War Department and the Wilson administration for using the military to advance the assimilation project. Individuals from all ethnicities would be assimilated by virtue of their training and exposure to “American” values (Ramírez, 2009, 77). Blacks, of course, were excluded from the assimilating and mainstreaming project as they were kept in segregated units.



Puerto Ricans, on the other hand, came from a very racially mixed society which meant that some could be welcomed into the assimilation project and sent into White units while others would be sent to Black units. Initially the War Department had planned to train “8000 White Porto Ricans” in Camp Jackson, South Carolina who would join the White 81st Division, while “4000 [Puerto Rican] negroes” would be sent to Camp Upton Yaphank in New York, and join the 93rd Colored Division (*Washington Post*, 1917). On the basis of comments from War Department’s officials, the article stated that

training them in connection with our own citizens the Porto Rican soldiers will come to feel themselves as part of the Army of the United States. The psychological influence will be a considerable factor in making the Porto Rican American soldier in no way distinguishable from the men from New York, Michigan, or California. They will be led in English under native Porto Rican and American officers. (1917)

Although the governor of Puerto Rico, Arthur Yager, believed that military training would create a new Puerto Rican, he opposed sending the recruits overseas for training. In a letter to Frank McIntyre, chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs,<sup>8</sup> Yager urged him to train the troops in Puerto Rico stating that it would be humiliating to the soldiers and their officers to send them straight to the Continental US because “perhaps, 1/3 of these men who will be accepted for service never worn shoes in their lives. They wear nothing but a cotton shirt and cotton trousers and have nothing else to wear unless it is furnished to them” (Yager, 1917a). He was aided in his campaign to train Puerto Ricans on the island by the leaders of the local major parties.

As opposition to sending Puerto Ricans to train on the mainland mounted, the War Department reluctantly agreed to raise a Puerto Rican division and train it on the island, and authorized the creation of the 94th Infantry Division to be composed of two White and two Colored “Porto Rican” regiments (Negroni, 1992, 422–423, 440–445). The “Porto Rican” division numeration followed that of the 92nd and 93rd “Colored” divisions, as these units were created to placate the demands of these communities’ leaders, and as part of a segregated military. Forced to accept these troops, the War Department decided that Puerto Ricans would be used to relieve White soldiers from non-combat assignments, freeing them for combat duty. McIntyre wrote a memorandum to the chief of War Plans Division informing him of the political, economic and social benefits of mobilizing Puerto Rico’s “large surplus population, that is, a population for who in the present there is no continuous employment” (McIntyre, 1918). Dealing in strict utilitarian terms and making clear that his views were not of a military nature, McIntyre reported that the men who had gone through military training in Puerto Rico “have been very much improved, physically and otherwise, and are better off for having had it and to that extent are of greater economic value” (1918). However, he did not envision any military use for them.

8 The B.I.A. was a branch of the War Department charged with supervising the administration of the US’s ultramarine possessions.



McIntyre had made clear to Governor Yager earlier, that training Puerto Rican recruits in the US would “make them better men on returning to Porto Rico, physically and otherwise, this, even though they should not go abroad at all for service” (McIntyre, 1917).

## Linking the Puerto Rican Effort to Decolonization and Desegregation

To house the trainees, a large military facility was built in Santurce, east of San Juan, known as Camp Las Casas. It served to train over 500 Puerto Ricans as US Army officers and roughly 18,000 soldiers (Esteves, 1918). Puerto Ricans reluctantly accepted segregation as the War Department announced there would be “Colored” and “White”: Puerto Rican units within the Porto Rican Division (*Washington Post*, 1917). Puerto Ricans who joined or were drafted in the continental United States were sent to either White or Black units depending on their skin color and classified accordingly. The decision to segregate troops on the island was not well received in some sectors, but beyond expressing their opposition to this measure there was nothing to be done. The newspaper *Justicia*, which had an adversarial relationship with the governor, denounced that “[u]nder the administration of Arthur Yager the line separating the men of color is finally established in Puerto Rico.” The editorial, however, continued by exhorting Puerto Ricans to volunteer for service and argued that “the complete triumph of the United States and the Allies will also defeat all privileges” (*Justicia*, 1918). Since these media outlets supported the war effort, segregation was blamed on the governor, while it was believed that service would help end racial discrimination.

The Afro-Puerto Rican politician and leader of the staunchly pro-American Republicanos, José Celso Barbosa, took especial interest in the case of the 375th Porto Rican Colored Regiment. He wrote to the commander of the 375th expressing his willingness to accept that the “national citizenry were divided in organizations and racially” but hoping that when the war ended the men’s willingness to sacrifice in “defense of their nation” would help to erase such divisions (*El Águila de Puerto Rico*, 5 October 1918). Celso Barbosa, like many early annexationists, viewed the United States as a progressive nation and believed that Puerto Ricans would eventually be incorporated into a more perfect union (Bernabe Ramos, 1996, 16–18).

The case of Black Puerto Ricans was also tied to the struggle of Blacks in the mainland and to that of colonial troops under French command. *El Diluvio*, which was associated with the Socialist party, editorialized: “The boys of the 375 will one day respond to the call of arms with the same unconditional bravery and tenacity shown by the colonial French troops and the brave Black soldiers of America” (Escabí, 1918a). Puerto Rican participation in the US armed forces was

strongly encouraged, and there was consensus about wanting to see the US emerge victorious, but the press and political leaders were not ignorant of the fact that many of the freedoms espoused by President Wilson were not enjoyed by Puerto Ricans and African Americans. Thus the call to arms was strongly predicated upon enfranchisement and a decolonization struggle.

## The Armistice and Demobilization

By 31 October 1918, three of the four regiments authorized for the Porto Rican Division had been trained and manned with 10,600 officers and soldiers. On 11 November, an armistice between the Allies and the German Empire came into effect ending hostilities in Europe. Knowing that demobilization would come sooner rather than later, the *Porto Rico Progress* sought to gauge the soldiers' contribution and what they had gained from military training. It announced that the men from Las Casas "no matter what their future may be, cannot help being better men for the few months of training they have had" (*Porto Rico Progress*, 29 November 1918). Another editorial in *El Diluvio* commented on those soldiers:

The majority of those peasants have learned to live a new life. What yesterday they took as normal: the old standards that they had accepted without a single complaint, cannot and will no longer satisfy them in view of the new habits and ideas they have acquired through the hard and fruitful labor in the military camp. (Escabí, 1918b)

In January 1919, the Puerto Rican division had been completely demobilized. The units from the island did not see combat. A soldier lamented after receiving his discharge papers and examining the document and the blank space reserved for battles, engagements and skirmishes: "If there were only three or four names in that line, how proud I'd be" (*Porto Rico Progress*, 27 December 1918). For the soldiers, reaching the battlefields was a matter of pride, of manhood. Local political leaders, on the other hand, thought that reaching the European theater and bleeding alongside Continental-American and Allied soldiers would have strengthened their respective political positions.

The experience of the African American soldier during and after the war suggests that had Puerto Rican units reached the theater of war their combat record would have been misconstrued as well. For African Americans, earning the right to fight had been difficult, service had been conditioned and demeaned. Black soldiers were the subject of derision and violence in the United States and in Europe. Black units such as the 93rd Colored Division, which fought under French command, outperformed most US White units. However, distorted accounts of their combat record became the basis for disbanding Black combat units, limiting the number of African Americans in the military and putting them





into even more subordinated roles after the war (Dalfume, 1969, 26–27). Instead of leading to equality and decolonization, the war was followed by a White supremacist backlash and the creation of a Jim Crow army that resembled and supported racial and colonial structures of power. The attitude of the military both reflected and reinforced that of a civil society that made Black soldiers in uniform the target of lynching mobs (White, 1969, 112).

Puerto Rican units, despite the islanders' willingness to serve, had no combat record. But a similar narrative followed the Puerto Rican units to the point that Continental officers assigned to them considered it a career ender, and, as late as the 1950s, War Department officials refereed to the Puerto Rican regiment as a "rum and Coca Cola" unit unfit for combat (Harris, 1980, 1–3). If members from these groups were allowed to fight in equal terms as Whites, and their contribution properly recognized, the rationale holding the empire and segregation would crumble. By institutionalizing the myth of the lack of fighting abilities of African Americans and Puerto Ricans, their manhood and fitness for full citizenship and self-rule continued to be doubted.

## **An Unheeded Call for Self-Government and the Seeds of Change**

Puerto Rican politicians tried to force the metropolis to at least ease the colonial status of the island. On December 1918, Representative Cayetano Coll y Cuchí, one of the most prominent separatists on the island, passed a resolution in the Insular Legislature urging President Wilson to support self-determination for the Puerto Ricans. Coll y Cuchí's resolution stressed that failing to act positively, would undermine the moral grounds of the American representatives in the peace negotiations thus jeopardizing their mission. Puerto Rico, by supporting the war and readying its sons for military service, he argued, "has demonstrated its fitness and capacity for self government that is being at present and always has been denied to the island" (*Porto Rico Progress*, 6 December 1918).

Coll y Cuchí reminded the president that Puerto Ricans

let out a cry of joy when the American Congress extended its laws to the island territory and called its sons to arms in order that they might play part in the great task of giving liberty to the world. And our soldiers gathered in the camps and our riches flowed into the vaults of the government. Thus was the rare spectacle of a people, who were themselves not free, hastening to give the blood of their sons to defend other nations. (*Porto Rico Progress*, 6 December 1918)

Linking Wilson's international rhetoric to Puerto Rico's issues, Coll Y Cuchí (1918) stated that the Puerto Rican soldiers had "left their homes to fight for

democracy, resting in the belief that when the war was over, victory won, and peace established, Porto Rico would be given the same freedom for which it fought.” The soldiers, in Coll y Cuchi’s opinion, had proved the aptitude for self-government of all Puerto Ricans. His demands, however, and those of the Puerto Rican legislature, would fall on deaf ears and the island’s political situation would change insignificantly between the two world wars.

But not all had been lost. The mass mobilization of Puerto Ricans, their willingness to go to war, and the visible transformation of thousands of barefooted and malnourished peasants into modern soldiers, helped to erode the myth of racial inferiority imposed on all Puerto Ricans by metropolitan observers, and on Puerto Ricans from the lower social strata by Puerto Rican elites. Writing three decades after the war and by then a general, Luis Raul Esteves commented that he believed that the training in Camp Las Casas served as the “first blood transfusion received by our tired people. Not only did it awaken our *jibaro*, but it taught him how to live a better life” (Negroni, 1992, 442). Esteves had doubted that the “malnourished *jibaritos*” he encountered at Las Casas would ever be ready to serve as combat troops and he longed to serve with his former Continental unit. However, his opinion changed: “I witnessed our boys’ physical transformation becoming aware of their disciplined spirit and military pride inherited from our ancestors; I changed my mind and felt proud of serving with *Boricua* troops” (Negroni, 1992, 442).

The *jibaro* had been presented at best as a romantic figure, and at worst as a reason for the island’s backwardness. Their transformation through military training proved that the *jibaros*’ alleged shortcomings were a function of the island’s structural social inequalities and not a characteristic of their persona. From the ranks of these soldiers, political leaders would emerge demanding change. Another war would be needed to bring some of their goals and demands to fruition, but the seeds of change were planted during WWI, as the Puerto Rican elites volunteered the masses for military service, and they responded enthusiastically. By doing so, they dented the gender and racial discourses rationalizing the subalterned status of Puerto Ricans within the American empire. And probably more important, the thousands of *jibaros* who supported the war effort and enlisted to serve, had also begun to destroy domestic narratives scapegoating them for the misfortunes of the island.

## Acknowledgement

I would like to thank my colleagues Arlene Torres, Anthony Brown, Milagros Denis-Rosario, Victor M. Torres-Velez and Ricardo Gabriel for their unwavering support and for reading early versions of this study during the Africana, African-America, Puerto Rican and Latino Studies Research & Writing Faculty Seminar



at Hunter College, CUNY. Likewise, many thanks to the blind referees for providing me with invaluable feedback and helping to strengthen my argument.

## About the Author

Harry Franqui-Rivera is a historian and researcher at CENTRO, the Center for Puerto Rican Studies at Hunter College, CUNY, and a public intellectual and blogger. His recent work includes “National Mythologies: US Citizenship for the People of Puerto Rico and Military Service,” in *Memorias: Revista Digital de Historia y Arqueología desde el Caribe*, Universidad del Norte, Barranquilla Colombia, No. 21 (2013); and “Puerto Rican Veterans and Service Members’ Wellbeing and Place within the Diaspora” in Edwin Meléndez and Carlos Vargas-Ramos, eds., *Puerto Ricans at the Dawn of the New Millennium*, (CENTRO Press, New York, 2014). He has a forthcoming book, *Fighting for the Nation: Military Service and Modern Puerto Rican National Identities, 1868–1952* (University of Nebraska Press). He specializes in Puerto Rican, Caribbean, Latino and Latin American history and focuses on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. His work addresses issues of race, gender and identity within imperial–colonial relations, nation building projects, the creation of national identities, and the impact of military institutions in society, culture and politics. (E-mail: hf14@hunter.cuny.edu)

## References

- Alanis Enciso, F.A. 2010. “Vámonos pá’ México”: La comunidad mexicana en Estados Unidos y la conscripción militar durante la Primera Guerra Mundial, 1917–1918. *Historia Mexicana* 60(2): (238) 897–960.
- Allen, C. 1900. Porto Rico Civilian Governor, to Elihu R., US Secretary of War. Telegram, May 1900. Archivo General de Puerto Rico (AGPR): Oficina del Gobernador, Serie: Correspondencia General, Caja 224, Folio 1595.
- Allen, E. Jr. 1979. “Close Ranks”: Major Joel E. Spingarn and the Two Souls of Dr. W.E.B. DuBois. *Contributions in Black History* 3(4): 25–38.
- Ashford, B. 1934 (1998). *A Soldier in Science: The Autobiography of Bailey K. Ashford*. San Juan, Puerto Rico: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico.
- Bernabe Ramos, F. 1996. *Respuestas al colonialismo en la política puertorriqueña 1899–1929*. Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico: Ediciones Huracán, Inc.
- Briggs, L. 2002. *Reproducing Empire, Race, Sex Science, and US Imperialism in Puerto Rico*. Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Burk, J. 1995. Citizenship Status and Military Service: The Quest for Inclusion by Minorities and Conscientious Objectors. *Armed Forces and Society* 21(4): 503–529.
- Butler, J. 1999. African Americans in the Military. In *The Oxford Companion to American Military History*, ed. J.W. Chambers II. New York: Oxford University Press.



- Christian, C. 1989. Joining the American Mainstream: Texas' Mexican Americans during WWI. *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 92(4): 559–595.
- Córdoba Dávila, F. 1918. *House of Representatives US to Baker, N., Secretary of War, 10 January*. Río Piedras, Puerto Rico: Centro de Investigaciones Históricas, Proyecto Caribeño (CIHPC), Caja 30 Cartapacio 7 Documento 1, C.
- Dalfume, R. 1969. *Desegregation of the US Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939–1953*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press.
- Del Valle Atilas, F. 1917. La Lección del Examen Físico, *El Buscapié*, 17 October.
- Departamento de la Guerra: Dirección del Censo de Puerto Rico. 1899 (2003). *Informe sobre el Censo de Puerto Rico, 1899*. Reprint San Juan, Puerto Rico: Academia Puertorriqueña de la Historia.
- Du Bois, W.E.B. 1918. Close Ranks, *The Crisis*, July.
- El Águila de Puerto Rico*. 1917. Mensaje de la Cámara de Delegados al Presidente Wilson, 10 April.
- El Águila de Puerto Rico*. 1918. Prove that You are 100% American, 9 October: 1.
- El Águila de Puerto Rico*. 1918. Regimiento 375, El Doctor Barbosa y los Sres. Godreau, 5 October.
- El Buscapié*. 1918. Más Noticias del Campamento, 14 January.
- E.R. 1918. The Jibaro as a Rookie, *Porto Rico Progress*, 12 July.
- Escabí, N. 1918a. Realidades del Ambiente – El 375, *El Diluvio*, 24 August.
- Escabí, N. 1918b. Untitled, *El Diluvio*, 16 November.
- Estades Font, M.E. 1998. *La presencia militar de los Estados Unidos en Puerto Rico 1898–1918: Intereses estratégicos y dominación colonial*. Río Piedras, Puerto Rico: Ediciones Huracán.
- Esteves, L.R. Capt. 1918. Report 27 May 27. Las Casas, P.R: Headquarters 2nd Porto Rico Training Camp. Río Piedras, PR: CIHPC, Caja 30, Cartapacio 4, Documento 1, K.
- Franqui, H. 2010. Fighting for the Nation: Military Service, Popular Political Mobilization and the Creation of Modern Puerto Rican National Identities: 1868–1952. PhD dissertation, Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts.
- Gribbin, W. 1975. A Matter of Faith: North America's Religion and South America's Independence. *The Americas* 31(4): 470–487.
- Harris, W. 1980. *Puerto Rico's Fighting 65th US Infantry: From San Juan to Chorwan*. San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press.
- Hoganson, K. 1998. *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Hostos, E. 1995. *Los rostros del camino; Antología*. San Juan, Puerto Rico: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña, Programa de Publicaciones y Grabaciones.
- House Committee on Public Lands, Subcommittee on Territorial and Insular Possessions. 1947. *A Bill to Amend the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, Election of Governor: Hearings on H.R. 3309, 80th Congress, 1 session, 19 May: 35–36*. Microfilm Collection, Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts.
- Johnson, J. J. 1980. *Latin America in Caricature: The Texas Pan American Series*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Justicia*. 1918. Acusan al Viejo Racista de Kentucky de Ser El Instigador, 8 June.
- Kaplan, A. 1993. Black and Blue on San Juan Hill. In *Cultures of United States Imperialism*, ed. A. Kaplan and D.E. Pease, 219–236. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.



- Lentz-Smith, A. 2009. *Freedom Struggles: African American and World War I*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Mahan, A.T. 1899 (1970). *Lessons of the War with Spain and Other Articles*. Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press.
- Marín Román, H.R. 2009. *¡Llegó la gringada! El contexto social-militar estadounidense en Puerto Rico y otros lugares del Caribe hasta 1919*. San Juan, PR: Academia Puertorriqueña de la Historia.
- McIntyre, F. Chief. 1917. B.I.A to Yager, A. Governor of P.R., 24 November 24. Rio Piedras, PR: CIHPC, Caja 30, Cartapacio 7, Documento 1, E.
- McIntyre, F. Chief. 1918. B.I.A Memorandum to Chief of the War Plans Division, 18 December. Rio Piedras, PR: CIHPC, Caja 30, Cartapacio 7, Documento 1, A.
- Moskos, C. 1993. From Citizens' Army to Social Laboratory. *The Wilson Quarterly* 17(1): 83–94.
- Muratti, J. 1946. *History of the 65th Infantry, 1899–1946*. San Juan, PR: US Army Forces Antilles.
- Negroni, H. 1992. *Historia militar de Puerto Rico: en conmemoración del encuentro de dos mundos*. España: Ediciones Siruela S.A.
- Negroni, H. 1969. Hostos y su pensamiento militar. *Journal of Inter-American Studies* 11(2): 269–292.
- Pagán, B. 1972. *Historia de los Partidos Políticos Puertorriqueños (1898–1956)*. Tomo I. San Juan, PR: Academia Puertorriqueña de la Historia.
- Paralitic, C. 1998. *No quiero mi cuerpo pa' tambor: El servicio militar obligatorio en Puerto Rico*. Santurce, PR: Ediciones Puerto.
- Pérez, L. Jr. 1998. *The War of 1898: The United State and Cuba in History and Historiography*. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.
- Picó, F. 1887. *1898: La Guerra después de la Guerra*. Rio Piedras, PR: Ediciones Huracán, Inc.
- Porto Rico Progress*. 1918. Men leave Las Casas Five Companies a Day: Glad to Go, Sorry to Leave, 27 December.
- Porto Rico Progress*. 1918. The Celebration, 29 November.
- Porto Rico Progress*. 1918. The Handling of Recruits as They Come to Las Casas, 5 July.
- Puerto Rican Provisional Regiment of Infantry: Register of Officers Showing Dates of Appointment. 1904. Rio Piedras, PR: CIHPC, Caja 31, Cartapacio 11, Documento 2.
- Ramírez, J. 2009. *To the Line of Fire!: Mexican Texans and World War I*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.
- Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended 30 June. 1900. Part. 13. San Juan, PR: Ediciones Puerto.
- Report of the Military Governor of Porto Rico on Civil Affairs. 1902 (2003). San Juan, PR: Academia Puertorriqueña de la Historia, Ediciones Puerto.
- Scarano, F. 1996. The Jíbaro Masquerade and the Subaltern Politics of Creole Identity Formation in Puerto Rico, 1745–1823. *The American Historical Review* 101(5): 1398–1431.
- Stephanson, A. 1995. *Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right*. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Tischler, B. 1986. One Hundred Percent Americanism and Music in Boston during World War I. *American Music* 4(2): 164–176.



- US Citizenship and Immigration Services. 2013. Naturalization through Military Service: fact sheet, June, <http://www.uscis.gov/news/fact-sheets/naturalization-through-military-service-fact-sheet>, accessed 9 March 2014.
- US Department of Defense. 2008. Troops in Afghanistan take citizenship oath, May, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=50012>, accessed 9 March 2014.
- US Department of Veterans Affairs. 2013. Profile of veterans: 2011 data from the American Community Survey, March.
- Washington Post*. 1917. Porto Ricans to Receive Instruction in English, 19 November.
- Williams, C. 2010. *Torchbearers of Democracy: African American Soldiers in the World War I Era*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- White, W. 1969. *Rope and Faggot*. New York: Arno Press.
- Yager, A. 1917a. Governor of P.R. to McIntyre, F. Chief, B.I.A., 9 November. Rio Piedras, PR: CIHPC, Caja 30, Cartapacio 7, Documento 1, D.
- Yager, A. 1917b. Governor of P.R. to McIntyre, 6 June. Rio Piedras, PR: CIHPC, Caja 30, Cartapacio 7, Documento 1, J.