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CHAPTER SEVEN

BASE-POLITICS MANAGEMENT

THE SUBNATIONAL DIMENSION

Since the very dawn of strategic theory itself, nation-states have been the central analytical concern of both theorists and practitioners. It is nation-states, they maintain, that act upon the global stage and that decide issues of war and peace with one another. We have reviewed, in preceding chapters, the base-political strategies of nations, and concede that individual countries *do* have their distinctive national approaches to dealing with foreign forces in their midst.

Yet nation-states, in the final analysis, are not the ultimate units of real-world action in international affairs. It is *people*—not nations—that ultimately act. It is *people*—not nations—that perceive, feel, and decide. Any meaningful analysis of national behavior, or prescriptions for strategy, must thus be mediated through an assessment of how real people, in real institutional settings, actually behave. It must, in a word, have an appreciation for the "micro." It is the micro, after all, that simulates more closely than any other level of analysis the patterns of cognition, and the dynamics of decision, that actually prevail in the real world.

Related to the analytical concerns of base politics, that means disaggregating the nation-state. The preceding two chapters have taken us some distance in that direction. They have detailed the variety of subnational constraints—institutional, environmental, and even cultural—that shape the operation of base politics, and that give rise to its striking and yet systematic cross-national variation.

Now we return, with a deepened sense of the parameters shaping base-politics decision making, to the focus of chapter 4: the real-world actors themselves, and the choices they make. This means considering local governments, mass media, and NGOs, and their interests, when attempting to understand outcomes and when making prescriptions. As is suggested in the following pages, "thinking local" provides a much richer interpretation of outcomes—especially of discontinuous or heterogeneous patterns in those outcomes—than conventional strategic approaches can provide.

Such an orientation also aids considerably in predicting real-world outcomes, since it provides a way to systematically include sub-national

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interests and institutions in accounts of causality. Case studies generated thereby likewise provide useful tools for judging and improving policy. In short, turning our attention to the trees in the forest—to how they are systematically related, and to their concrete profiles—gives us a detailed appreciation of the nuances concerning why bases stay, and why bases go, that we can get in no other way.

"Thinking local" does, to be sure, raise more unsettling questions about the future of base politics than one routinely hears from generals, diplomats, and businessmen from multinationals. Small-town mayors, students, teachers, and workers, after all, have fewer perceived stakes in global interdependence, and in what pass for national-security imperatives. Yet the information revolution and personal experiences are bringing grassroots actors closer to the concrete costs of national security, especially in time of war. To the extent that base politics becomes a mass political phenomenon, it tends to become more volatile and confrontational than would otherwise be true.

To demonstrate the importance of the grassroots dimension in shaping base-politics outcomes, this chapter presents three substantively important and analytically interesting cases full of empirical puzzles, whose resolution is not wholly intelligible in terms of strategic theory or nation-state, rational-actor analysis alone. It begins with the story of Okinawan bases, which *stay* despite the pervasive antimilitarist culture of that island. It continues with a discussion of the Vieques naval gunnery range, which *goes*, in the face of transnational antibase protest, despite a history of patron-client ties and pro-military sentiment in the American Caribbean, and on the small, tortured island of Vieques itself. Although the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, of which Vieques is a part, is technically American territory, strong cultural, geographic, and political detachment from the mainland make the Vieques case both analytically and substantively relevant to our central overall concerns with bases beyond America's shores.

The chapter concludes with an instructive yet sobering discussion of how nation-state actors—the United States and Britain in this case—can engineer the micropolitical structure of a base-politics situation on the small but strategic Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, in a region where their local presence is limited and largely unwanted. They do so by finessing those micropolitical constraints and maintaining the coherence of national strategy, despite the constraints that base politics might be expected to impose. By coming to terms with micropolitics, this chapter thus aims to extract lessons with concrete relevance for the practitioners of base politics, both pro and con, in an era of momentous global transition.

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BASES THAT STAY

Bases throughout the world, these pages have argued, are becoming embattled garrisons—defenders of respected values, crucial to global stability in an era of fragile interdependence, yet beset by hostile forces of nationalism and grassroots civilian resentment. Many have disappeared since the waning of the Cold War. Yet there are some that stay, counter to more general expectations. Empirical puzzles, of course, are the most attractive cases for theory building, because they best clarify causality. In bases that remain in the post–Cold War world, we thus find some stimulating catalysts for a deeper understanding not only of national sentiment, but also, more importantly, of the incentives that really drive base politics.

Okinawa: Antimilitarist Island Brimming with Bases

In all the universe of contemporary base politics, there are few more puzzling and contradictory cases than that of Okinawa. That tiny island of 454 square miles, almost exactly the size of Los Angeles, and smaller than the island of Kauai in the Hawaiian island chain,[1] was the site of the bloodiest battle of the Pacific War: a desperate, existential killing ground on which one-third of the entire Okinawan population of 450,000 people lost their lives, many at the hands of a Japanese military nominally defending them.[2] As many died in the battle of Okinawa as in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.[3]

Following the war, the U.S. military occupied the island for nearly three decades, expropriating large amounts of Okinawan land to build bases.[4] Naturally, the predominant share of that land has since been returned. Yet American bases continue to occupy roughly 20 percent of Okinawa's entire territory, much of it in the heart of the island's most populous and economically important urban centers.

Apart from aircraft noise and environmental problems, periodic accidents and crimes also plague fragile Okinawan cohabitation with the bases. In September 1995, a brutal gang-rape of a twelve-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl led to a massive protest of 85,000 demonstrators—the largest in the island's history; 27,000 protestors also converged on Kadena Air Base on the eve of the 2000 Okinawa G-7 Summit.

As the heritage of its bitter history, Okinawa has a clear collective norm of antimilitarism, often emotionally expressed. It also features a broad range of entrenched interests actively working to undermine support for the bases. Citizens' groups and labor unions are unusually strong and militant in Okinawa, compared with the situation on the Japanese mainland, with many NGOs working actively against the base presence.

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One prominent group, which organized the massive protest demonstrations following the 1995 rape incident, is the Okinawa Women Act against Military Violence coalition, whose broad international contacts are enhanced both by the ease of international travel and by the Internet. Its members have demonstrated at the United Nations, lobbied in Washington, and joined hands with antibase movements around the world, including those agitating against the U.S. Navy gunnery range on Vieques Island off Puerto Rico. Another major protest group is the Okinawa Peace Network, which promotes antibase awareness and organizes rallies and demonstrations, such as the confrontation against the 2000 Okinawa G-7 Summit.

The Okinawan mass media is also deeply involved in antibase protest. The major Japanese dailies do not circulate extensively in Okinawa, and national television, except for the national public NHK network, does not broadcast there. This leaves the *Ryūkyū Shimpō* and the *Okinawa Times*, together with their television affiliates—a veritable information cartel—holding more than 80 percent of the overall local media market.[5] Both publications are stridently opposed to the bases. So are the local Okinawa High School Teachers' Union, the mainstream faculty and students at Ryūkyū University, and the "1-tsubo (approximately four square yards)" small-scale landowners. They buy tiny plots of land inside the bases to establish their legitimacy as antibase protestors.

The major Okinawan political and administrative institutions also voice virtually unanimous antibase sentiment. Long-time Governor Keiichi Inamine (1998–2006), for example, was nominally affiliated with both the conservative LDP, and its coalition partner Kōmeitō. Yet he stridently criticized the bases, insisting that a prospective new replacement facility at Henoko should supplant the current Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma and be built with a fifteen-year limit on U.S. military presence, which the Pentagon adamantly refused to accept. The local Okinawan assembly likewise persistently features an LDP majority, yet frequently calls for a reduction in the American military presence, especially that of the U.S. Marine Corps.

Despite this clear Okinawan collective identity of antimilitarism, a strong antibase bias in the Okinawan media and local government, and a continuing string of incidents relating to the massive concentration of U.S. bases on the island, there is remarkably little transformation in the basing structure, even when political leaders agree to undertake it. In 1996, for example, a decision was made, through the SACO process, to relocate the 835th U.S. Army Transportation Battalion from Naha Port, in the heart of Okinawa's capital, to a much less crowded coastal area near Urasoe City further north. Both mayors supported the move. Yet, more than a decade later, it had not been made.

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An even more striking case is the proposed relocation of the Futenma Marine Air Station to a heliport off the coast of the northern Okinawan town of Nago.[6] This move would close a dangerous air field—next to an elementary school in the heavily populated town of Ginowan in central Okinawa—and move it to a sparsely populated seaside location. Such a move would presumably benefit both the Okinawans and the U.S. military. U.S. President Bill Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Ryūtarō Hashimoto solemnly agreed at their 1996 summit conference to have this relocation completed within five to seven years. Yet the two countries had not even *started* to implement the proposal by the time, nine years later that it was scheduled to be completed. Indeed, the Bush administration in July 2004 proposed to scrap the entire Henoko/Nago base-construction project, and to move the Futenma facilities to a different location entirely.[7]

In October 2005, at a high-level meeting involving top foreign and defense-policy officials of both nations,[8] the U.S. and Japanese central governments jointly unveiled a concrete new plan to relocate Futenma replacement facilities to "shoreline areas of Camp Schwab [in Nago] and adjacent water areas of Oura Bay." KC-130s previously based at Futenma were to be relocated to the SDF's Kanoya base near Kagoshima, in southern Kyūshū.[9] Following the agreement, senior Japanese officials visited prospective sites for the new deployments all over Japan, including Okinawa, to explain the new relocation plans and alleviate the concerns of local residents. Domestically, the "2+2" agreement was explained as an "interim report," scheduled to be finalized in March 2006.

The local communities showed decidedly mixed reactions, as might be expected, reflecting their parochial views. Okinawa Governor Inamine instantly opposed the relocation scheme, as it proposed to leave most of the functions Futenma had been performing, however important in security terms, in his home Okinawan constituency. Other local communities rebelled as well. In February 2006, Kanoya residents in Kyūshū elected a mayor opposing the proposed relocation of functions from Futenma,[10] and a major antitransformation conference at Urasoe City, Okinawa attracted three hundred participants.[11] Clearly, local incentives in Okinawa and Kyūshū diverged from those of their national counterparts.

In January 2006, however, Nago residents in the target relocation area elected a new mayor backed by Japan's ruling parties, amenable to pragmatic discussion with the central government.[12] He showed some willingness to discuss relocation to Henoko, provided that the original 1996 plan for an offshore facility were revived. This concept, however, ran counter to American ideas supporting a mixed onshore-offshore facility, embodied in the October 2005 "2+2" agreement, ultimately forcing adoption of a hybrid plan.[13]

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Three major micropolitical factors, no less politically real for being in tension with national strategy, have complicated the actual Futenma relocation, so confidently resolved at the macrolevel well over a decade ago. These grassroots considerations have forced the U.S. and the Japanese national governments into successive revisions of their own proposals. This pattern, of course, inverts the conventional picture of how base politics operate, but the military's grassroots concessions on programmatic details, combined with strategic compensation, have been crucial in assuring that some agreement on Futenma relocation could actually be reached.

First, there are clearly environmental problems at issue. The area off Henoko, to which the Futenma facility was to be moved, is home to the dugong, or sea cow. This sea mammal is found commonly in Southeast Asian coastal waters, but is relatively rare in Japan, necessitating time-consuming environmental impact studies. Even after the dugong issue was surmounted, there was controversy over the prospective physical profile of the proposed Henoko facility, and over the means of construction. These complications slowed the Futenma relocation project still further.

Secondly, there have been sharp differences of corporate interest and opinion regarding the three proposed options (an offshore floating base, a facility sunk into steel piers, and a landfill facility). Ishikawajima Harima (IHI) and other Japanese shipbuilding companies, together with major members of the Hashimoto faction of the ruling LDP, and, reportedly, the U.S. contractor Halliburton as well, preferred the floating offshore facility, which was the original SACO (intergovernmental) choice. Yet the prospective cost was exorbitant—reportedly one hundred times more per year, amortized over its prospective life, than the annual rental on Futenma.[14]

Corporate lobbying was relatively subdued for nearly a decade following the 1996 summit agreement in the face of residential opposition to the project as a whole, which virtually stalled its implementation. Yet the corporate interest in various options naturally did not totally disappear. This continuing corporate concern was reflected in the decision of the U.S. and Japanese governments in September 2005 to restudy the possible construction of an offshore heliport facility close to Camp Schwab.[15] The mainland Japanese defense and construction industries were engaged in this issue, but divided in their support for one of two potential options: the American Henoko shallow-waters plan, backed by Washington; and the Camp Schwab plan, which Tokyo supported.[16]

The offshore-facility concept provided few concrete benefits for Okinawan firms. Ultimately it was dropped in favor of the landfill—the third and final option—due to the prospective dividends for Okinawan

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

Figure 7.1. The Embedded Heritage of Compensation Politics: Okinawa's Economy, Japan's Central Government, and America's Bases

Source: Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office. *U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa*, 2005 edition, at: http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/contents/attach/7520/statistics2005.pdf.

construction firms of the latter approach. Yet Governor Inamine's insistence on a fifteen-year limit for U.S. basing rights at the facility continued to delay construction, despite the prospective benefits to local interests. So the aging, Korean War–era Futenma Air Station, dangerous and outmoded, continued to operate, more than a decade after a summit agreement to close it, despite new plans for the relocation agreed at the May 2006 "2+2" meetings. It remained a striking monument to the sometimes perverse stability bias of Japanese compensation politics.

THE MICROPOLITICAL ROOTS OF OKINAWAN POLICY CONSERVATISM. Beyond the Futenma-specific factors enumerated above, what accounts for this profound conservatism of real-world Okinawan base politics—so sharply at odds with the collective antimilitarist norms of the Okinawan people, as eloquently demonstrated by the results of mayoral elections at Nago and Kanoya City? Several key factors related to the local incentive structure, including rental fees on base land, and Japanese central government compensation for Okinawa, appear to be at work.

Compensation politics, after all, is a deeply embedded pattern in Japanese base relations, as noted in chapter 6. As shown in figure 7.1, total military-related income in Okinawa has constituted roughly 5 percent of

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the Okinawan Gross Prefectural Product (GPP) since 1987.[17] The military is the third-largest income source in the prefecture, following government aid—itself related to base presence—and tourism.[18] In FY2005, Japan's central government earmarked more than Y7.5 billion (over $600 million) for development in northern Okinawa. And in December 2005, with Okinawa continuing to be reluctant about the Futenma relocation plans, Tokyo decided to add another 10 percent to that figure, bringing it to ¥8.2 billion in fiscal year 2006.

The Okinawan prefectural government (OPG) has routinely criticized the bases, under both progressive and nominally conservative administrations. It has consistently demanded time limits on American military leases for the proposed Henoko replacement facility. Yet the OPG simultaneously benefits from the presence of the existing bases, and from increases in base land leases provided by the Japanese central government, due to the impact of rising base land values on the local tax base within the prefecture. Communities adjacent to the bases also benefit from "burden-easing funds," disbursed liberally by the DFAA, as discussed in chapter 6. That multifaceted agency has also traditionally made substantial compensation payments to individuals for noise, pollution, violation of fishing rights in traditional waters, and environmental counter-measures, which help to stabilize the grudging local tolerance of the existing bases.

Since 1991, lease-land rentals have been the largest base-related expenditure in Okinawa.[19] The rental payments are attractive, as suggested in figure 7.2b, and have grown increasingly so in recent years, amidst the general stagnation in real estate markets across Japan. In contrast to the situation on the Japanese mainland, where less than 10 percent of base land is rented from private individuals, in Okinawa a full 67 percent of the land used for military facilities is privately owned.[20] More than 32,000 "contract" landowners received over ¥76.4 billion ($562 million) in rental income for their properties during 2003.[21] For many, their land was their sole source of income. Apart from conventional base rentals, many Okinawan landowners also profited from a peculiar local institution called "tacit farming." Under this arrangement the American military allows a landowner to continue to farm his plot of land inside a base in order to gain income in addition to the rent. Even when land is returned to the owners, due to the downsizing of bases, the Japanese government additionally continues to pay rent to landowners for up to five years after return of the land, thus giving them a substantial grace period to seek alternate tenants.

As indicated in figure 7.2, the lease payments for land rented to the U.S. bases consistently account for about 2 percent of Okinawan GPP, and that share has been steadily rising since around 1990. Military lease payments in Okinawa have increased in monetary terms every year since 1988, while

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



Figure 7.2. The Changing Political Economy of Okinawan Military Land Leases
a. Rising dependency of Okinawan GPP on military land rental fees
b. Decreasing commercial prices for land

Sources: Okinawa Prefecture Military Base Affairs Office. *U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa*, 2005 edition, at http://www3.pref.okinawa.jp/site/contents/attach/7520/statistics2005.pdf, and *Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport, Todō Fuken Chika Chōsa* (Investigation of Land Prices) 2005, at: http://tochi.mlit.go.jp/.

Note: While the commercial price of land has been dropping since 1998, base rental fees are steadily rising, making leasing land to the U.S. military increasingly attractive.

commercial land rentals have been stagnant or declining, especially since the outbreak of the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis.[22] Increasing Okinawan base-rental fees, which are far above market-equilibrium prices, clearly give local landowners, many of whom would have few alternative uses for their property, deepening stakes in the continued presence of existing bases.

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Thus, there is little wonder that Okinawan base landowners collectively constitute a powerful, insistent interest group—formidably, if discreetly, organized at the grassroots—in Japanese compensation politics. Local landowner associations are represented at the prefectural and national levels by the Okinawa Federation of Landowners of Land Used for Military Purposes, which lobbies the prefectural and central governments on rent-related issues.[23] The federation's powerful veto-player role was evident in the 1996 base-reduction referendum, when it worked strongly against change.[24]

Many Okinawans leasing land to the bases are encouraged by the compensation-politics equation to continue doing so, whatever their personal feelings regarding the bases or the military may be. At least seven particular types of groups in Okinawa benefit economically from the base presence. Together, they create a formidable community for stability in existing base configurations, contrasting sharply and incongruously to the clear antimilitarist tradition of the island as a whole.

Local base workers, together with their unions, also have positive stakes in the U.S. military presence in Okinawa, although those interests are clearly declining in importance relative to those of the base landlords. Yet the bases still employ over 8,300 workers, and base-worker salaries—totally paid by the Japanese central government—come to well over $500 million.

Zenchūrō, the All Japan Security Forces Labor Union, has traditionally been a strong political supporter nationwide of the Japan Socialist Party, and has participated actively in campaigns against the basing presence.[25] It has more than 6,300 members in Okinawa. Yet it nevertheless has symbiotic, interdependent interests with the bases, and indeed with the ruling LDP itself.[26] Since base-worker salaries are paid by the Japanese central government, Zenchūrō needs to make accommodation with the government in order to secure improved treatment for its members.[27] Thus, there have been natural limits—albeit subtle and subterranean ones—as to how far the opposition, especially the Socialists, are willing to push the LDP on base-management issues.

Japanese private firms also have vested interests in the bases. The U.S. military spends $500 million annually on base-related contracts with Okinawan vendors,[28] and local construction companies receive over 80 percent of the total military-construction contracts granted in Okinawa, which amounted to about ¥14 billion in fiscal year 2005.[29] In 2003, the construction sector accounted for a full eight percent of Okinawan GPP,[30] or a significantly larger portion than the 6.8 percent that construction comprised in Japan's GDP as a whole.[31]

Public works expanded massively in connection with preparations for the Okinawa Summit of 2000. And they would presumably benefit

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further from the huge Futenma relocation project now impending. When it finally gets off the ground, Futenma could take more than five years to complete, and provide thousands of new jobs in an Okinawa with an unemployment rate far above Japan's national average.[32]

Small-scale shopowners are politically pivotal in Okinawa because they are a primary constituency of the Kōmeitō Party, the LDP's principal coalition partner since 1998 at both the national and the local levels. They have recently been important supporters of conservative governors Keiichi Inamine and Hirokazu Nakaimao. U.S. personnel and their dependents spend at least $5 million annually on rental payments for off-base housing, as well as consumer goods and services. This stimulus is obviously important to the fragile local economy of the prefecture, whose nonmilitary prospects remain bleak.

WHEN STABLE BECOMES *TOO* STABLE. The unspoken self-interest of multiple Okinawan constituencies in the stability of the bases—a natural product of compensation politics—becomes clear when attempts are made to move those bases. Whatever strategic benefits military transformation may have in the abstract, it has distinct, and very concrete, political drawbacks in a nation engaged in compensation politics like Japan. Even when the transformation effort also enhances local safety, and eases citizen inconvenience, it can be remarkably difficult to achieve, as the Futenma case so graphically illustrates.

Three factors, in sum, have made Okinawa base politics so stable that base relocations amply justified on prudential or strategic grounds are *politically* difficult to make, even with the tacit support of the American military, as manifest in the cases of Futenma and the Naha Port. First, as noted above, there have been environmental issues, in which the environmental studies paradoxically require quite a long period of status quo maintenance.

Secondly, conflicting, fractionated interests regarding policy options have contributed to gridlock. The most intense interests—those of the landlords—are strongly attached to the status quo. So, too, in a perverse, paradoxical way, are those of many key opposition groups, which have financial incentives to keep the base issues boiling. As long as Okinawan base politics are troubled, the central government, in their estimation—and confirmed by past experience—will continue to compensate them for refraining from even more confrontational behavior. The final factor promoting a paradoxical stability in Okinawan base relations is the nature of the Japanese and U.S.-Japan policy processes. The consent of myriad groups—local communities, the Okinawan prefectural government, the Japanese national government, Japanese public opinion, the American military, and the U.S. federal government among them—is

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needed to realize a proactive outcome. This conversely affords multiple opportunities for veto-players to obstruct such a positive result.

It is important to distinguish, in the politics of Okinawan basing, between support for the status quo basing structure and support for American basing policy. Insofar as U.S. policy is oriented toward the status quo, there is no issue. Yet the ambitious, transformation-oriented policies of former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld inspired new ambivalence in the Okinawan political-economic world about Washington, and a complex new divergence of interests, that the more static policies of the past did not generate.

Given the conflicting incentive structures of those desiring change, and the strong, if quiet, preference of landlords for the status quo, the outcome in Okinawa has been, and may well continue to be, policy drift. This surprising stability is tacitly accepted by local players, but could be corrosive of broader national-alliance credibility, and subversive of ambitious American defense strategies in the long run. Such a stability bias is manifest dramatically in both Japanese ambivalence regarding 2004 and 2005 Bush administration transformation proposals to ease basing burdens on Okinawa, and also in the domestic political difficulties of implementing the October 2005 "2+2" agreement. This stability bias of Okinawan base relations—the clear fruit of compensation politics—clearly bodes ill for the rapid implementation of such seemingly dynamic and sensible proposals, whatever their broader strategic logic in the currency of military transformation may ultimately be.

BASES THAT GO

The elemental equations of base politics are all too often obscured in abstract discussions of strategy and national interest. It is crucial, as we have noted, to take a more microscopic view. We need to understand more clearly the incentive structure of those actually making working-level base-politics decisions.

The most fundamental distinction, when the state is deconstructed, is that elite and mass interests often do not coincide. Elites, tending to be more cosmopolitan, more economically interdependent with foreign nations, and more insulated personally from the day-to-day inconveniences related to the presence of foreign bases, are more prone to support that presence. The general public is in normal circumstances more reluctant to do so.

Local opinion and interest can thus often be pivotal in base politics, especially in relatively pluralistic political systems, as noted in chapter 4. The cases of Okinawa, and of Japan more generally, both suggest that

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base politics can be stable, even where local cultures of antimilitarism are pervasive, as long as local interests are to some degree well satisfied. But what happens when those interests are more deeply injured by the bases, and local sentiments are mobilized against them?

Vieques: Transnational Networks, Media Symbolism, and Protest

Latin America and the Caribbean lack Okinawa's bitter experience with war and militarism. To the contrary, military leaders have traditionally played a major role in national governance, and the military is generally well respected as a profession in this "macho" part of the world. The cultural bias, if any, is the reverse of Okinawa's.

Yet the local politics of military basing in the Caribbean, and their impact on actual policy outcomes, are in many ways remarkably similar to what they are in Okinawa. As we will see, interests, rather than cultural predisposition, have been determinant in Vieques, as they are also in Okinawa. And local interests have been surprisingly potent, even when questions of national strategy and symbolism are involved.

Vieques is a paradoxical story, both in base politics and in American politics more generally, as suggested earlier.[33] The story takes place in Puerto Rico, where the U.S. Navy has strong local influence as a major employer: the nearby Roosevelt Roads Naval Station is one of the largest U.S. Navy bases in the world. The American military owns around 12 percent of the land in Puerto Rico as a whole, and is culturally respected there, as noted above. Indeed, large numbers of Puerto Ricans are serving voluntarily, often in elite, dangerous units like the Marines and the 82nd Airborne Division, in U.S. military operations worldwide.

To compound the paradox, Vieques itself is a small island next to Puerto Rico, over 1,500 miles across the Caribbean from Washington, D.C. Its citizens lack the right to vote Stateside. They are generally only poorly educated, are economically vulnerable, and do not have a tradition of political activism. That their interests would prevail in conflict with those of the American military is far from an intuitively obvious proposition.

Nearly three generations ago, in 1938, the U.S. Navy began acquiring land on Vieques by expropriation. Its objective: to build a major firing range on a small island eight miles off the eastern coast of Puerto Rico. Vieques was only twenty miles long and four miles wide, which made it perfect for naval gunnery practice. By the end of World War II, the navy had bought three-quarters of the 33,000 acres of land on the island for use in maneuvers and for bomb storage.

Unfortunately Vieques, unlike Kahoolawe in Hawaii or most other American naval gunnery ranges, was populated. When the firing ranges

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were originally set up on the island's western and eastern coasts, many of the population of 12,000 were relocated, some on only a single day's notice, to the center of the island. There they were at least mildly distanced from the gunnery range, although shells routinely flew over their heads to intended targets. By 2000 the total local population had fallen to 9,300. Yet the population *density* remained six hundred per square mile on the tiny island—thirty times the average of twenty per square mile for the United States as a whole.

Lacking a tradition of sustained protest, for well over fifty years the Viequenos suffered bombardment of their island, and a range of unusual ills, without the redress that occurred much earlier at most gunnery and firing ranges used by the U.S. military elsewhere.[34] During the year 2000, for example, around 2.9 million pounds of ordnance were dropped on Vieques—almost half of all that used for military target practice in the entire United States. Of twelve U.S. gunnery ranges, Vieques was the only one, except the uninhabited San Clemente Island offshore California, involving ship-to-shore shelling. Analogous ranges in Massachusetts and Delaware were closed long ago. All ranges involving air-to-ground shelling were in the American South, deep inside military bases. Yet all the ordnance in the U.S. military inventory, except missiles, was used on Vieques—a populated island with nearly 10,000 inhabitants.

The health and environmental consequences of American military activity on Vieques over the years have also been serious. Periodically there have been casualties from the shelling. In April 1989, for example, there was an accident on board the USS *Iowa*, in its operations offshore Vieques, in which an explosion killed 47 men. In 1996 bombs fell perilously close to a local fisherman. And on April 19, 1999, one shot, in a volley of two thousand bombs launched from the USS *Hornet*, hit an observation post on the island and killed a local security guard, David Sanes Rodriguez.

Apart from the direct casualties, the broader health and environmental consequences of the navy's presence on Vieques, as indicated, have also been serious. Infant mortality on the island is 50 percent higher than that for Puerto Rico as a whole, while the incidence of cancer is 27 percent higher. Recent environmental assessments have shown high levels of heavy metals in the local soil, toxics in the water supply, and coral reefs damaged by navy bombs. In August 1999 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency itself noted that the navy had committed numerous violations of the Clean Water Act and other statutes on Vieques.[35]

The empirical paradox for base politics in the Vieques case is thus *not* the injustice that is so often stressed by residents and movement activists: it is the strange combination of protracted inaction, followed by sudden policy activism that is characteristics of this case. Why did it take so long

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for the injustices implicit in the Vieques situation to be dealt with? And then why, given this long heritage of inaction, did change occur so suddenly? Only subnational and transnational analysis can provide the answers.[36]

WHY POLICY CHANGE TOOK SO LONG. Many of the factors creating stability in the Vieques situation were parallel to those in Okinawa. The U.S. military was sensitive to the inconveniences of the local situation, and provided some compensation, although it simultaneously stressed its desire to remain on the island. Before the sustained protest movements of the 1990s began on Vieques, for example, the navy built an undersea pipeline from the main island of Puerto Rico to supply previously unavailable fresh water to the island. Periodic payments have also been made to island dwellers to compensate for inconvenience. Beneficiaries of the U.S. military presence at one point went to Washington with a petition signed by 2,500 people, on an island of 9,000, asking the navy to stay on.[37]

It also took time for the infrastructure of later protest to develop. Vieques is, as noted, an isolated island, populated by largely uneducated fishermen and laborers. It needed networks to the broader world in order to give effective political expression to its latent local frustrations. One critical development in this regard was the establishment of proactive NGOs, such as the Committee for the Rescue and Development of Vieques, founded in 1993.[38]

Another important background factor was the U.S. Navy's 1994 decision to locate a $9 million "Relocatable Over-the-Horizon Radar" (ROTHR) on Vieques. The island has historically had a high rate of cancer mortality, and many residents felt that a ROTHR facility would make the problem worse by intensifying carcinogenic microwave stimuli. A three-year struggle to prevent construction of the ROTHR facility ultimately proved futile, but laid the basis for later, more successful activism.[39]

It was catalytic events, ultimately, that dramatized the Vieques problem, brought it to the attention of a wider public, and fused the transnational networks that ultimately proved crucial to substantial policy action on the issue. Most important was the aforementioned death of David Sanes Rodriguez, the civilian security guard, in military shelling of the island during April 1999. This was followed two days later by a gathering of fifteen local boats at the site of the shelling; the establishment of local disobedience camps by the Puerto Rico Independence Party and other such groups; the invasion by one thousand Marines of these disobedience camps, followed by massive arrests; and a subsequent escalation of the protests following the initial violence.

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After Sanes's death, the navy never again used live ammunition on Vieques. It always limited itself to inert bombs—dummy ordnance not containing explosives.[40] It returned, near the end of the Clinton administration, nearly one-third of the land it held on the island to civilian control. Yet none of the navy's compromises broke the momentum of the protest movement. To the contrary, that movement escalated its protests, broadened its network, and ultimately forced the total withdrawal of the navy from Vieques as a whole.

WHY CHANGE FINALLY OCCURRED SO SUDDENLY. The second important question for base politics regarding Vieques, as suggested earlier, is why policy change, once begun, proceeded so rapidly. Virtually no change occurred in the miserable circumstances on Vieques from 1938, when the navy first arrived, until April 1999, when Sanes was killed. Yet by June 2001, little more than two years later, President George W. Bush had announced the total cessation of military testing operations on Vieques. What catalytic forces were at work to propel this rapid transformation—at the national as well as local levels?

Four critical forces for change were eroding the U.S. military presence on Vieques. The first was the increasing activism of the local commonwealth government in Puerto Rico. In June 1999 then governor Dr. Pedro Rossello appointed a Special Commission on Vieques, composed of members from the three major local political parties, the Catholic Church, a representative of Vieques fishermen, and the then mayor of Vieques. The commission submitted a report supporting the position of the local community: immediate termination of bombing, total demilitarization and decontamination, return of all lands to the people, and sustainable development of Vieques. This commission was pivotal in legitimating the antimilitary movement, and in enlisting the involvement of key groups, such as the church, the women's movement, and environmentalists, that were central to its broader ultimate success within Puerto Rico.

The local commonwealth government alone, however, had clear limitations, especially in linking the Vieques struggle to broader U.S. national political processes. Even the governor of Puerto Rico was never able to meet with the president or other key White House staffers to discuss Vieques. Official Washington contacts were limited exclusively to the navy and, in the Bush administration, to then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

The limitations of the local Puerto Rican government's efforts were clear in January 2000, when Governor Rossello announced an agreement with the Clinton administration to allow the continuation of bombing in return for $90 million in U.S. grants and the mere promise of a referendum. This agreement was overwhelmingly rejected in Puerto

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Rico itself. The NGOs then turned to direct confrontation with Washington and the American military, spurning the governor's self-declared achievements at mediation.

In this deepening confrontation, the NGOs made special efforts to broaden their networks on the U.S. mainland. Between May 2000 and late 2001, close to 1,500 peaceful demonstrators were arrested, and hundreds were sent to prison. Among those incarcerated: U.S. Congressman Luis Gutierrez of Chicago; Jacqueline Jackson; the Reverend Al Sharpton; environmental lawyer Robert Kennedy, Jr.; and actor Edward James Olmos. In New York a well-known Puerto Rican environmentalist was arrested for climbing the Statue of Liberty in protest over Vieques, and others were arrested for civil disobedience actions in New York, Washington, D.C., Connecticut, and elsewhere.

The arrests, and the attendant national publicity stateside, were important catalytic elements in the process of policy change through the consciousness raising that they provoked, particularly on the U.S. mainland. The arrests built on, and ultimately helped consolidate, the emerging transnational dimension of the protest movement. The NGOs capitalized on and solidified these links across the Caribbean by establishing a local stateside office—in Hudson County, New Jersey; by extensively using the Internet; and by traveling extensively—to Okinawa, Guam, Cuba, and elsewhere—to publicize their movement. In turn, activists from Okinawa, Washington, D.C., and elsewhere around the world also came to visit them in Vieques.

A second crucial catalyst to resolving the Vieques struggle was legitimation. The broad Puerto Rican public, and ultimately a substantial segment of the American national political elite as well, had to come to believe that the Viequenos had a just cause. Following the Puerto Rican commission just mentioned, a broad range of epistemic groups, particularly environmentalists, went to Vieques, in the latter half of 1999 and thereafter, to do multiple technical studies documenting the military-related health and environmental damage that local residents had claimed. The Catholic Church also became involved with the issue, as did some decorated Vietnam veterans and retired senior U.S. military officers, lending the Viequenos further credibility.[41]

Thirdly, the crucial key to resolution, in the final analysis, was ultimately transnational networks, including trans-Caribbean ties between San Juan and Washington, D.C. As the Vieques issue broadened internationally through the interaction between Vieques activists and those in Okinawa, South Korea, Guam, and Cuba, much of it via the Internet, defense policymakers in the Pentagon became concerned about possible spillover effects for base politics in other parts of the world that might

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flow from the increasingly enflamed Vieques confrontation. This became particularly consequential for policy in the Bush administration, due to then Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's general belief in the intrinsic value of transformation away from old-style basing and military operations—irrespective of the details of Vieques itself. He appears to have grasped clearly both the political liabilities involved, and the long-term strategic irrelevance of the Vieques gunnery range itself.

Finally, elite networks, coupled with rising public consciousness of the Vieques issue, also created another, ironically potent constituency for change: high-level Republican politicians. Following the extended post-election Florida recount in late 2000, during which the presidency hung in the balance for a full month, Republicans were highly conscious of the Hispanic vote on the U.S. mainland and realized the salience that the Vieques issue was gaining among Hispanics. Governor George Pataki, facing an uncertain reelection battle in 2002, following the million-vote Gore New York state plurality in 2000, was especially concerned about the disquiet among Hispanics, and made these concerns clear at the new Bush White House.[42]

Some congressional Republicans, such as Senator James Inhofe of Oklahoma, pointed critically to the perverse national-security implications of suspending military-training activities for political reasons. Yet these concerns were over-ridden at the White House. Following a conclave among senior White House officials, including Karl Rove, President Bush's top political advisor, who had voiced concerns that growing opposition to the bombings was costing Bush critical support among Hispanic voters, and a visit to the White House personally by George Pataki, President Bush himself announced the suspension of military operations on Vieques by 2003.[43]

Ultimately the basing implications of the Vieques case greatly transcended Vieques itself. On May 1, 2003, the navy fully vacated the Vieques gunnery range, although the property remained in federal hands. That navy withdrawal was followed in March 2004 by the closing of the massive Roosevelt Roads Naval Station in Puerto Rico, one of the largest American naval facilities in the Caribbean.[44] The navy did continue to operate an offshore range of nearly 200,000 square miles to practice high-tech naval maneuvers, an underwater tracking range for submarines, and an electronic-warfare range in waters near Vieques. The army also kept access to a large National Guard firing range—Camp Santiago, in Salinas, Puerto Rico.

Yet the political reverberations of the Vieques base-politics struggle were loud and continuing, apart from the major retrenchments noted above. The U.S. military also transferred regional headquarters out of

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Puerto Rico to Texas and Florida. At the same time, it also relocated the Southcom Joint Command headquarters out of Latin America entirely, moving it northward across the Caribbean to Miami, Florida.

The Vieques case, like that of Okinawa, has its counterintuitive elements, which underline once more the importance of the micropolitical dimension, and the fallacy of cultural determinism in base politics. Although set in a "macho" culture that values the American military and volunteers substantial numbers of its citizens for the most elite and dangerous units, this cultural regard did not lead to a promilitary outcome. To the contrary, the navy was ultimately expelled in 2003 from an island firing range it had occupied for more than half a century, through the efforts of a broad, grassroots movement with transoceanic aspects that captured the symbolic attention of both the Puerto Rican people and many Hispanics throughout the mainland United States.

The striking discontinuities of the case—the abruptness with which the sustained anti-base movement of the late 1990s initially arose, as well as the suddenness with which it ultimately succeeded—are further testimony to the salience of shifting political interests and calculations in determining policy outcomes, as opposed to the more limited and immutable role of culture. Especially striking are the pragmatic calculation of interest, and flexible reaction, of conservative groups in the process, despite an often assumed tendency to dogmatically side with the military. Both Donald Rumsfeld's Pentagon and the Bush-Rove White House, not to mention Republican New York Governor George Pataki, proved to be highly pragmatic on the Vieques issue. Indeed, their tacit support for the demonstrators, once the political potency of their grievances was clear, turned out to be a key element in the protest movement's success.

To fully understand the success of the antibase movement in Vieques, however, one must go beyond the paradoxical pragmatism of its normally promilitary supporters to an important emerging technological and political-economic reality: the growing power of transnational forces in base politics. The apparent contest of a small, unsophisticated island people against the might of the U.S. military was far more than that. Indeed, it was linked in, through television and the Internet, to the global antibase movement, and to Hispanic ethnic politics on the U.S. mainland itself. The formal commonwealth links between San Juan and Washington were only a relatively minor factor enhancing the impact of Vieques developments on American basing policy.

It was precisely those new linkages to the global village—forged through an astute campaign strategy by the movement's organizers—that alarmed conservative forces, and rendered them so pragmatic in the end. Clearly, the Vieques struggle points, for military supporters, to an ominous conclusion. In the information age, when local interests are

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harmed by bases, countervailing local interests supportive of base presence are nonengaged, and the mass media publicizes the costs of basing to the broader world, there can easily be bases—indeed, literally embattled garrisons—that go.

FINESSING BASE POLITICS

As we have seen, the risks of host-nation base politics are often substantial. Regime shifts can depose allies, bring antagonistic new groups to power, and introduce major new volatility and uncertainty into negotiating processes. Broad, long-term populist trends can make empathetic host-nation elites ever harder to find, and increasingly unpredictable and rigid in their behavior even when they do appear. Culture conflict and symbolic politics can muddy prediction and negotiation as well.

Base politics almost everywhere in the world is growing more volatile—even in Japan and Italy, two rare, long-standing exceptions. At the same time, the advanced nations are being forced, by the war on terrorism, to deploy their troops into an unsavory range of failed states and otherwise stagnant political economies in the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia, into which they rarely ventured in the past. In these volatile locales (one can hardly call them states), base politics is almost by definition unstable.

For major basing nations like America, it would clearly be nice if base politics could be avoided altogether. Unhappily that is not possible. Yet in coping with this situation, one of the greatest imperatives is clearly finessing base politics wherever it can be done, especially when the construction of major, strategically important facilities is involved. Happily, given the increasingly long-range capabilities of modern strike aircraft, that at least is becoming ever more possible.

Diego Garcia: Answer to South Asian and Middle Eastern Uncertainties?

Virtually in the middle of the vast Indian Ocean, and roughly 3,000 miles due south of the Persian Gulf, lies the tiny island of Diego Garcia. This horseshoe-shaped coral atoll is only fourteen miles long, from tip to tip, with a lagoon four miles across in the middle. It became a British possession, seized from France along with Mauritius, during the Napoleonic Wars, remaining a quiet backwater until after World War II. Over the past quarter-century it has moved from obscurity to become one of the most strategically important military bases on earth, and yet one conspicuously and uniquely removed from the vagaries of base politics. Its emergence and expansion are testimony to the possibility of finding

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a way around the pitfalls that base politics so often otherwise imposes on military operations.

American military interest in Diego was originally animated by communications difficulties in the vast expanses of the Indian Ocean—one of the few parts of the globe where the United States in the early 1950s did not already have a basing presence. On one occasion the nuclear carrier USS *Enterprise* and two nuclear cruisers suffered a total communications blackout for 8–12 hours while transiting the Indian Ocean.[45] Such failures were fairly common, and inspired the U.S. Navy to dispatch study teams to inspect the island's potential for future use in a global network designed to obviate such problems. In the summer of 1957, the navy's commander of the Atlantic Fleet himself, Admiral Jerauld Wright, visited the island on such an inspection tour.[46]

In 1959 a study for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the "strategic-island concept" suggested Diego to be one of six islands worldwide of greatest significance for the U.S. Navy.[47]As the British steadily withdrew from East Africa, Mauritius, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Persian Gulf in the 1960s, heading toward Harold Wilson's 1968 announcement of a full British pullout "East of Suez,"[48] this American interest in Diego Garcia began to intensify. Someone had to fill the Indian Ocean strategic vacuum.

Paul Nitze played a central, far-sighted role in catalyzing support for a major American base on Diego Garcia, as he did on many long-term strategic issues of his day. Shortly after the Pentagon's strategic-island study was completed in 1961, Admiral Thomas Moorer, director of the Long-Range Objectives Group, took the concept of an American Diego Garcia base to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and got their approval of the navy-oriented plan, over initial air force reluctance.[49] Thereafter he went to Paul Nitze, then assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, who initiated formal diplomatic discussions, through his liaison officer in the State Department, on creation of a British Indian Ocean Territory that would allow stable American basing rights. Later, as secretary of the navy, Nitze continued to strongly back the idea of filling the "power vacuum" in the Indian Ocean with a base on Diego Garcia.

One of the central prospective complications was base politics. Diego Garcia was, after all, not an American possession, nor was it situated in a region where the United States was either well-liked or held political sway. India, to the north, was the most influential nation in the area, and adamantly opposed to American regional military involvement, due to its efforts within the nonaligned movement to have the Indian Ocean designated as a "Zone of Peace."[50] Nearby Mauritius was similarly suspicious of American intentions. Diego Garcia, although small, had native inhabitants who were ambivalent. And there were questions about this typically abrupt American intrusion in the House of Commons as well.[51]

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Still, the British Government was cooperative. In 1965 Britain, responding to Nitze's earlier quiet initiative, created an autonomous British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), splitting off Diego Garcia from Mauritius, an island that was later to become independent, and to grow relatively radical in foreign affairs. Together with Diego Garcia in the BIOT were three other small islands—Aldabra, Farquhar, and Des Roches. The United States was particularly interested in Aldabra as a potential base. Yet it abandoned this idea in the face of a strident campaign by a single British M.P., Tom Dalyell, irate at the potential ecological damage of building a major base on that tiny islet.[52]

Finessing this first exotic encounter with Indian Ocean base politics by shifting their attentions to the less controversial Diego Garcia, the British and U.S. governments, in December 1966, signed a framework agreement that formalized their commitment to the island's strategic development. This pact was to run for a period of fifty years until 2016, in the absence of decisions by either government to terminate it. The territory was to remain under British sovereignty, with facilities available to the United States without charge.[53] Two years later, in 1968, the United States sought formal permission from Britain to build a modest communications facility and associated air field on the island itself.

Then congressional politics began to intervene. Although the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee in November 1969 approved funding for the project, its Senate counterpart refused. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, a Democrat who was to be a persistent opponent of an Indian Ocean base throughout his remaining Senate career (until 1977), objected that new facilities in new parts of the world were inconsistent with the military downsizing implicit in Richard Nixon's declared Vietnamization policy.

Britain took the next fateful step in finessing base politics on Diego Garcia, side-stepping the deepening divisions in the U.S. Congress. In December 1970, it moved to resettle the 1,200 contract workers living on the island to gather copra on the nearby island of Mauritius.[54] A payment of £650,000 was made to Mauritius to help with the resettlement, and was increased during the 1980s when the endemic poverty of the islanders was revealed. The last contract workers left Diego Garcia in 1971, with Britain quietly adopting an immigration ordinance the same year that deprived these and other traditional Ilois tribal inhabitants of an exercisable right of return.[55] The construction of an air field by U.S. Seabees began soon thereafter. By 1973 both a naval communications station and a major twelve-thousand-feet runway had been completed.

Base politics on Diego Garcia itself had been temporarily neutralized by the resettlement of its inhabitants on Mauritius, and the political separation of Diego Garcia from Mauritius. Yet American politics then began to

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intervene once again, as the Ford administration, in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War and expanding Soviet operations in Somalia and Mauritius, sought funds for a major buildup in the Indian Ocean. In May 1975, Senate Majority Leader Mansfield once again proposed, less than a month after the fall of Saigon, that the expansion of U.S. military facilities on Diego Garcia be disapproved.[56] His Senate Resolution 160 was formally debated in the Senate for five hours on July 28, 1975, with the scale and implications of the emerging Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean being the major subject of contention.[57]

In September 1975 Senators John Culver (D-Iowa) and Edward Kennedy (D-Mass) requested, in an amendment to the 1976 Military Appropriations Bill, that Republican President Gerald Ford report on the history of U.S. government agreements regarding Diego, and provide a judgment concerning U.S. obligations to those people and previous efforts to assist them.[58] The 1979 Iranian Revolution, and the almost simultaneous Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, however, made Congress appreciate the strategic importance of Diego Garcia—the one major American land base within striking range of both Tehran and Kabul. Just as importantly, major opponents of the base at Diego, such as Majority Leader Mansfield, had left the Congress.[59] The congressional dimension of Diego Garcia base politics thereafter largely disappeared.

Driven by the new strategic situation, the United States and Britain agreed in 1980 to further expand their facilities at Diego Garcia. By 1981 the 12,000 foot runway on the tiny island could handle B-52 bombers as well as PC-3 Orion marine-surveillance aircraft capable of locating submarines. When construction was finally completed in 1986, at a cost of over $500 million, the neighboring lagoon could accommodate a full aircraft carrier battle group, with the naval and aviation fuel-oil storage capacity to support such a massive task force for a full month.

During all of America's subsequent wars—in the Gulf, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq—Diego Garcia has played significant roles. Indeed, B-52s based on the island flew incessant strikes into the heart of the Middle East in each conflict, supported by KC-10 and KC-135 refueling tankers. In the course of the 1991 Gulf War, for example, over six hundred B-52 missions were carried out from the island, while aircraft based in Diego dropped more ordnance on Afghanistan in 2001 than from any other location in the world.[60]

Although base politics were largely finessed in Diego Garcia, it took them a long time to fully disappear. The islanders sued the British Foreign Office for their uncompensated eviction from their homes, and in 2000 the High Court ruled that removal of the islanders was an "abject legal failure." It thereby overturned a 1971 ban by Britain that had

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prevented the islanders from returning to the island, and set up the prospect of renewed, legally driven political controversy.[61]

In response to this ruling, the British government immediately introduced a new restrictive ordinance, establishing a right to return for all the islands except Diego Garcia—where the vast majority of islanders had lived before their eviction. The islanders in turn again filed suit at the London High Court during 2003, but were once again, in October 2003, denied both the right to return to their home islands and to compensation.[62] The British government in June 2004 finally passed Orders in Council prohibiting access to all the Chagos Islands, overriding the 2000 High Court decision.[63]

Although some legal uncertainties remain, Uncle Sam, in collaboration with his old partner John Bull, appears to have successfully finessed base politics on Diego Garcia to a remarkable degree, on a strategically important problem. It is important to note, however, that the Diego circumstances are rather distinctive ones—not broadly analogous to the problems of embattled garrisons elsewhere. Diego became a virtually unpopulated island, and has never been self-governing. Much as it might like to do so, the U.S. military cannot rely on "Rent-a-Rocks" like Diego Garcia alone as its platforms for global power-projection.

As we have seen in the foregoing pages, it pays to look at the trees in the base-politics forest, not just at the woods as a whole. It is individuals, interacting in subnational groups, that ultimately move nations, often in directions at variance from what either national strategy or intuition might suggest. If subnational base politics cannot be finessed, it must be understood and appealed to. That brings our analysis to the financial dimension—so critical, and so often misunderstood.

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